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PROVING DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE:  
NEXT TO IMPOSSIBLE FOR MENTALLY ILL 
INMATES 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Mental illness is a debilitating condition that affects many people.1  
In prisons and other correctional facilities, the rate of people with mental 
illness is approximately three times higher than in the general 
population.2  For an inmate with a serious mental illness, such as 
schizophrenia, mental torment may become exacerbated by the 
conditions he faces in prison confinement.3  Instead of receiving needed 
treatment, the inmate may be left for days at a time in solitary 
confinement, left covered in feces in a hot, filthy cell with only water 
from a toilet to drink.4  Instead of helping the inmate, prison guards may 
simply ignore his cries for help, or even worse, may taunt or abuse him.5  
                                                 
1 See Human Rights Watch, Ill-Equipped: U.S. Prisons and Offenders with Mental Illness 
(2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1003/index.htm.  “Mental 
illness” is described as “mental disorders” that include a wide range of “impairments of 
thought, mood, and behavior.”  Id. at 30.  The level of such impairments can vary 
dramatically from person to person.  Id.  “Also, some individuals with mental illness have 
periods of relative stability during which symptoms are minimal, interspersed with 
incidents of psychiatric crisis.  Other individuals are acutely ill and dramatically 
symptomatic for prolonged periods.”  Id. at 30-31.  One court used the term “mental 
disorder” to characterize “organic functional psychoses, neuroses, personality disorders, 
alcoholism, drug dependence, behavior disorders, and mental retardation.”  Ruiz v. Estelle, 
503 F. Supp. 1265, 1332 n.140 (S.D. Tex. 1980), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th 
Cir. 1982); Estate of Novack ex rel. Turbin v. County of Wood, 226 F.3d 525 (7th Cir. 2000).  
For a discussion of what mental conditions qualify as “serious mental illnesses,” see infra 
text accompanying notes 131-32. 
2 Nat’l Alliance for the Mentally Ill, Criminalization of the Mentally Ill (2001), available at 
http://www.nami.org/Content/ContentGroups/Policy/criminalization2001.pdf 
(prepared for the 2001 Annual Convention); see also infra text accompanying notes 54-59. 
3 Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 58.  This report describes how mentally ill 
inmates are vulnerable to assault, sexual abuse, exploitation, and extortion.  Id. at 56.  The 
report further explains that this vulnerability is heightened when a prison does not employ 
a sufficient number of trained correctional staff to monitor, supervise, and protect mentally 
ill prisoners.  Id. 
4 See id. at 2; see also Dennis Cooley, Prison Victimization and the Informal Rules of Social 
Control, 4 FORUM ON CORR. RESEARCH 31 (1992). 
5 Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 82.  An inmate’s cries for help may take the 
form of bizarre or self-destructive behavior, such as cutting himself, masturbating publicly, 
or smearing feces on the wall.  David Lovell & Lorna A. Rhodes, Mobile Consultation: 
Crossing Correctional Boundaries to Cope with Disturbed Offenders, 61 FED. PROBATION 40 (Sept. 
1997). 
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If the inmate attempts suicide to escape the mental torture, he may be 
stripped naked and thrown into an empty, cold observation cell.6 
A disturbing example of correctional facility officers’ treatment of a 
mentally ill inmate was reported in an Eleventh Circuit case from 1995.7  
In that case, Pamela D. Young, an eighteen-year-old woman,  suffered 
from manic-depression.8  She was sentenced to serve jail time at a city jail 
in Georgia.9  Less than two months after entering the jail, Young 
complained to a jail guard that she was hearing voices.10  The guard 
responded to Young’s complaint by putting her in an isolation cell.11  
While in isolation, Young attempted to flood her cell with urine.12  
Because the urine dampened Young’s clothing, jail guards stripped her 
naked and shackled her to a bed that had no mattress.13  Young could not 
reach the toilet and, as a result, she was forced to urinate and defecate 
where she sat.14  Young remained in isolation, mentally deteriorating 
until she became delusional.15  In her delusional state, Young banged on 
the door repeatedly.16  As a result, guards sprayed her with mace.17  
                                                 
6 Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 3 (explaining that prison guards most often 
view prisoners with mental illnesses as disruptive and difficult and therefore place the 
inmate in solitary confinement cells). 
7 Young v. City of Augusta, 59 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 1995). 
8 Id. at 1163.  “Manic-depression is an affective psychosis characterized by extreme and 
pathological elation alternating with severe dejection.”  Id. at 1163 n.2 (citing 8 MCGRAW-
HILL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 114 (5th ed. 1982)). 
9 Id. at 1164.  The case originated when Young was arrested for stealing a pack of 
cigarettes from a grocery store.  Id. at 1163.  She was found guilty of misdemeanor theft and 
was sentenced to serve a ninety-day sentence or to pay a five-hundred-dollar fine.  Id.  
Young was unable to pay, so she faced the jail sentence.  Id.  Before her transport to the jail, 
Young was placed in a holding cell.  Id.  While in the cell, she removed her shoes and 
underwear and set them on fire.  Id.  Setting the items on fire led to another charge for 
destruction of city property because the cell was damaged by the fire.  Id.  Young pleaded 
guilty to the destruction charge and was sentenced to another five-hundred-dollar fine or 
ninety days in jail.  Id.  Young’s father had previously informed people associated with the 
judicial system in Augusta, Georgia, that Young was manic-depressive.  Id. at 1163-64.  He 
requested that his daughter be allowed to serve any jail time that she received at the 
Georgia Regional Hospital in Augusta.  Id. at 1164.  His request was ignored, and instead 
she was taken to the city jail.  Id. 







17 Id.  Young also reported that she was sprayed with mace by the jail guards as she was 
being escorted to and from the shower facilities.  Id. at 1164 n.8. 
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Later, Young had a verbal argument with a female guard.18  The guard 
hit Young in the eye with her fist while Young was still shackled to the 
bed.19  The guard continued to beat Young until other guards 
intervened.20  When Young brought a claim against the city in district 
court, the court granted the city’s motion for summary judgment.21  The 
failure to provide Young with adequate mental health care and the 
difficulties she faced in obtaining a remedy illustrate the problem 
addressed in this Note. 
Part II.B of this Note explains that punishing inmates that exhibit 
symptoms of mental illness like Pamela Young, instead of providing 
needed treatment, is considered inhumane and contrary to the Eighth 
Amendment’s protection of inmates from cruel and unusual 
punishment.22  The Supreme Court has decided that prisons cannot deny 
inmates needed medical care.23  Mental health care is included within the 
meaning of medical care.24  Thus, denying mentally ill inmates needed 
mental health care violates their Constitutional rights.25  Even so, Part III 
of this Note examines how mentally ill inmates face higher hurdles than 
                                                 
18 Id. at 1165. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 1163.  Young filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim in the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of Georgia.  Id.  After the court granted the city’s motion for summary 
judgment, Young appealed.  Id.  The First Circuit heard the appeal and concluded that 
genuine issues of material fact remained, and as a result, reversed and remanded the case 
for further proceedings.  Id. 
22 The Eighth Amendment prohibits the use of cruel and unusual punishment against 
confined inmates.  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see also infra Part II.B.  The fact that a person is 
in prison does not deprive that person of certain constitutional rights.  See Turner v. Safley, 
482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987) (“Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from 
the protections of the Constitution.”).  The Eighth Amendment is a protection for prison 
inmates, but jail inmates’ protection is derived from the Fourteenth Amendment.  Fred 
Cohen & Joel Dvoskin, Inmates with Mental Disorders: A Guide to Law and Practice, 16 
MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 462 (1992). 
23 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976).  The Supreme Court held that this 
amendment provides the right to medical care because failure to provide adequate care 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.  Id.; see also infra notes 95, 97-101 and 
accompanying text. 
24 Lower courts extended the right to medical care to include the right to mental health 
care.  See, e.g., Steele v. Shah, 87 F.3d 1266, 1269 (11th Cir. 1996); Torraco v. Maloney, 923 
F.2d 231, 234 (1st Cir. 1991); Seifullah v. Toombs, 940 F.2d 662, 662 (6th Cir. 1991); Wellman 
v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 272 (7th Cir. 1983); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 
1982); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 574 (10th Cir. 1980); Inmates of Allegheny County Jail 
v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 763 (3d Cir. 1979); Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47-48 (4th Cir. 
1977). 
25 See infra Part II.B. 
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physically ill inmates when seeking to remedy an Eighth Amendment 
violation.26 
As described in Part II.C, inmates may sue state actors for 
Constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to obtain a remedy.27  In 
1976, the Supreme Court announced the first test for determining if the 
state has violated a prisoner’s right to medical care:  The inmate must 
prove the state’s, or a state actor’s, deliberate indifference to a serious 
medical need.28  In 1994, the Court set forth a higher culpability standard 
in order to hold the state liable, requiring actual subjective knowledge by 
the prison official.29  Lack of guidance by the Supreme Court has resulted 
in inconsistency among lower courts as to the meaning of “adequate 
medical care” and  “deliberate indifference.”30  Given the complexities of 
mental illness and prison guards’ general lack of awareness of mental 
health needs, the mentally ill face a tougher burden in proving actual 
knowledge than their physically ill counterparts.31  For example, if 
untrained in mental health issues, a prison guard may not be aware of 
symptoms of a mental health crisis.32  Liability is avoided because the 
guard simply did not have actual knowledge of a serious medical need.33  
This is not as likely with a physical condition, which is more easily 
recognized by a layman.34 
This Note addresses the problem of the substantial barriers 
encountered by mentally ill inmates who attempt to remedy violations of 
                                                 
26 See infra Part III. 
27 See infra notes 113-21 and accompanying text.  This applies to both government run 
and privately run prisons, just as municipalities can be considered state actors.  See infra 
note 121. 
28 See infra note 98 and accompanying text. 
29 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); see also infra notes 161, 170, 172 and 
accompanying text.  Commentators have criticized the subjective intent requirement.  See, 
e.g., Philip M. Genty, Confusing Punishment with Custodial Care: The Troublesome Legacy of 
Estelle v. Gamble, 21 VT. L. REV. 379, 390 (1996).  One author identifies three problems with 
the Court’s focus on the motivations of prison personnel in analyzing prison condition 
cases.  Id.  “[F]irst, the theoretical premise upon which the imposition of an intent 
requirement is based is wrong; second, an intent-based standard is unworkable in cases 
involving challenges to conditions of confinement; and, third, the use of an intent-based 
standard is inherently weighted against prisoners.”  Id. 
30 See infra Part II.D.  The inconsistencies are illustrated between the Fifth and Seventh 
Circuits in Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1339 (S.D. Tex. 1980), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 
679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982), and Estate of Novack ex rel. Turbin v. County of Wood, 226 F.3d 
525 (7th Cir. 2000). 
31 See infra Parts III.A-B. 
32 See infra Parts III.A-B. 
33 See infra Parts III.A-B. 
34 See infra Part III.A. 
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their rights to adequate mental health care and suggests a two-fold 
proposal in order to alleviate such barriers.35  First, consistent guidelines 
need to be established among the circuits as to the requirements for 
adequate medical care.36  More specifically, these guidelines need to 
include procedures for evaluating and diagnosing the mentally ill, a 
mandate for training prison guards in mental illness and suicide risk 
symptoms, and a requirement for referring inmates to trained mental 
health professionals if such symptoms present themselves.37  Mandatory 
evaluations would bridge the gap between mental health professionals 
and inmates because access to the mental health staff would not depend 
on the judgment of a guard.38  Training guards to recognize “red flags” 
and requiring referrals to the mental health staff would also bridge the 
gap because guards oversee the daily activities of inmates, but 
professionals do not see the “red flags” unless they are alerted by the 
guards.39  Thus, conducting regular mental health evaluations of inmates 
and training guards to recognize symptoms and make referrals would 
make it easier for a mentally ill inmate to gain access to a professional 
who can diagnose a serious medical need. 
The second part of the proposal is to remove the subjective 
knowledge standard from § 1983 claims for violations of inmates’ Eighth 
Amendment rights.40  That way, prison guards could be held liable for 
deliberate indifference of an inmate’s serious medical need if they should 
have known of the medical need, rather than avoiding liability by 
claiming they simply did not know.41  This proposal would provide a 
safeguard if the guidelines in the first part of the proposal are not 
followed.42  For instance, if an inmate exhibits signs that he is suicidal, 
                                                 
35 See infra Part IV. 
36 See infra Part IV.A.  For a discussion on the disparity between the circuits on what 
constitutes adequate mental health care, see infra text accompanying notes 172-86. 
37 See infra Part IV.A.  The training of guards should enable them to recognize symptoms 
of mental illness and signs of a suicide risk, but need not enable them to be able to treat or 
diagnose mental illness or recognize when an inmate is “faking.”  Proper diagnoses and 
treatment would be accomplished by requiring mandatory referrals by guards to the 
mental health staff when such symptoms arise. 
38 See infra Part IV.A. 
39 See infra Part IV.A. 
40 See infra Part IV.B. 
41 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); see also infra text accompanying note 
169. 
42 The first part of the proposal suggests procedures for providing evaluations and 
diagnoses of the mentally ill, training prison guards in mental illness and suicide risk 
symptoms, and requiring referrals to trained mental health professionals if such symptoms 
present themselves.  See infra Part IV. 
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but a guard believes the inmate is faking and thus fails to make a referral 
to mental health staff, the inmate still has a remedy because the guard 
should have known that a serious medical need potentially exists and 
should have made a referral to trained mental health staff to make such a 
determination.43 
II.  BACKGROUND:  THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE MENTAL HEALTH CARE AND 
THE REMEDY FOR A VIOLATION OF THIS RIGHT 
Mental illness plagues the state correctional systems at a rate of 
nearly one out of every six inmates, according to the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics.44  These inmates have the right to needed mental health care, 
as provided by the Eighth Amendment.45  However, when this right is 
violated, mentally ill inmates face barriers to obtaining a remedy that are 
more difficult for a mentally ill inmate to overcome than physically ill 
inmates.46 
First, Part II.A examines the prevalence of mental illness in 
correctional facilities and what treatment is provided for those inmates.47  
In addition, this Part addresses particular problems that mentally ill 
inmates face.48  Next, Part II.B examines the Eighth Amendment, which 
gives mentally ill inmates the right to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishment, and subsequent cases that interpret this Amendment as 
providing a right to mental health treatment.49  Then, Part II.C introduces 
the remedy under § 1983 for an infringement of the right to mental 
health treatment and the two-part test that must be satisfied to prevail on 
such a claim.50  This test, called the Estelle Test, requires proof that a 
serious medical need existed and prison officials were deliberately 
                                                 
43 See infra Part IV.B. 
44 See Paula M. Ditton, Bureau of Justice Statistics: Special Report, Mental Health and 
Treatment of Inmates and Probationers 1 (1999), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/ 
pub/pdf/mhtip.pdf; see also infra Part II.A. 
45 See infra Part II.B.  The Eighth Amendment prohibits the use of cruel and unusual 
punishment against confined inmates.  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  The Supreme Court held 
that this amendment provides the right to medical care because failure to provide adequate 
care constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).  
Lower courts later extended this right to mental health care.  See supra note 24 and 
accompanying text. 
46 For a discussion of the difficulties that mentally ill inmates face in obtaining a remedy, 
see infra Part III. 
47 See infra Part II.A. 
48 See infra Part II.A. 
49 See infra Part II.B. 
50 See infra Part II.C. 
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indifferent to that need.51  Accordingly, Parts II.C.1 and II.C.2 then 
examine the two parts of the Estelle Test separately and the particular 
difficulties that mentally ill inmates face in proving each part.52  Finally, 
Part II.D addresses the split among the circuits as to what mental health 
treatment standards are constitutionally acceptable.53 
A. Mental Illness in Correctional Facilities 
Mental illness is highly prevalent among prison inmates.54  The rate 
of mental illness among prison inmates is three times higher than the 
general population.55  According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, in 
1998, nearly one out of every six inmates in state prison facilities suffered 
from a mental illness.56  More specifically, 283,800 people with mental 
illnesses were incarcerated in the United States:  approximately 16% 
(179,200) of state prison inmates; 7% (7,900) of federal inmates; 16% 
(96,700) of people in local jails; and 16% (547,800) of probationers.57  
                                                 
51 See infra Part II.C.  The test is named after the case that established it, Estelle v. Gamble, 
429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
52 See infra Parts II.C.1 and II.C.2 (discussing the serious medical need requirement and 
the deliberate indifference requirement, respectively). 
53 See infra Part II.D. 
54 See Ditton, supra note 44, at 1.  These findings are based on self-reported data from the 
1997 Survey of Inmates in State and Federal Correctional Facilities, the 1996 Survey of 
Inmates in Local Jails, and the 1995 Survey of Adults on Probation.  Id. at 2.  One factor that 
may attribute to this high prevalence is that many mentally ill people are improperly 
incarcerated instead of treated in the community.  T. Howard Stone, Therapeutic Implications 
of Incarceration for Persons with Severe Mental Disorders: Searching for Rational Health Policy, 24 
AM. J. CRIM. L. 283, 356 (1997) (“Many of these inmates are inappropriately placed in jails 
and prisons because there is no alternative placement.  Community mental health 
treatment is currently unavailable or inadequate to meet the needs of persons with mental 
disorders.”). 
55 See NAMI, supra note 2. 
56 See Ditton, supra note 44, at 3.  Some commentators have said the data from the U.S. 
Department of Justice study underestimated the problem.  See Walter L. Gordon, III, Old 
Wine In Old Bottles: California Mental Defenses at the Dawn of the 21st Century, 32 SW. U. L. 
REV. 75, 77 n.16 (2003). 
57 Ditton, supra note 44, at 1.  Another study conducted jointly for the National Alliance 
for the Mentally Ill and the Public Citizen’s Health Research Group reported that the rate of 
serious mental illness varies from state to state.  Stone, supra note 54, at 287-88 (citing E. 
FULLER TORREY ET AL., CRIMINALIZING THE SERIOUSLY MENTALLY ILL:  THE ABUSE OF JAILS AS 
MENTAL HOSPITALS 13 (1992)).  “[S]tates such as Wyoming, Nevada, Idaho, and South 
Carolina reporting prevalence rates of less than three percent, and states such as 
Connecticut, Hawaii, and Colorado reporting prevalence rates of more than ten percent.”  
Id. at 287.  In addition, the study reported a higher prevalence rate of serious mental illness 
associated with larger jail size.  Id.  “Jails with an average daily population of over one-
thousand inmates reported a prevalence rate of 8.7%, while jails with an average daily 
population of less than fifty inmates reported a prevalence rate of 3.3%.”  Id. at 287-88. 
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Other studies have revealed that “between 6.5% and 10% of inmates 
suffer from a ‘serious’ mental illness, and another 15% to 40% of inmates 
suffer from a ‘moderate’ mental illness.”58  Contributing to the already 
disproportionate number of mentally ill people in prison, the rate of 
mentally ill inmates continues to rise.59 
                                                 
58 James R. P. Ogloff, Ronald Roesch & Stephen D. Hart, Mental Health Services in Jails 
and Prisons:  Legal, Clinical, and Policy Issues, 18 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 109 (1994).  In a study 
of New York prisons, the researchers reached similar results using slightly different 
terminology.  Stone, supra note 54, at 288 (reporting that “five percent of the inmates 
studied were found to have a ‘severe psychiatric disability’ and that ten percent of prison 
inmates had a ‘significant psychiatric disability’”) (citing Joel A. Dvoskin & Henry J. 
Steadman, Chronically Mentally Ill Inmates: The Wrong Concept for the Right Services, 12 INT’L 
J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 203, 207 (1989)).  For a discussion of what mental conditions qualify as 
“serious mental illnesses,” see infra text accompanying notes 131-32. 
59 Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 19.  The study reported that “[t]here are no 
national statistics on the historical rates of mental illness among the prison population.”  Id.  
However, the study reported that some states have reported a significant increase in the 
proportion of prison inmates who are diagnosed with a serious mental illness in recent 
years.  Id. 
For example, the mental health caseload in New York prisons has 
increased by 73 percent since 1991, five times the prison population 
increase.  In Colorado, the proportion of prisoners with major mental 
illness was 10 percent in 1998, five to six times the proportion 
identified in 1988.  Between 1993 and 1998 the population of seriously 
mentally ill prisoners in Mississippi doubled and in the District of 
Columbia it rose by 30 percent.  In Connecticut, the number of 
prisoners with serious mental illness increased from 5.2 percent to 12.3 
percent of the state’s prison population.  Indeed, nineteen of thirty-one 
states responding to a 1998 survey by the Colorado Department of 
Corrections reported a disproportionate increase in their seriously 
mentally ill population during the previous five years. 
Id.  The continued rise in the rate of mentally ill inmates in correctional facilities can be 
attributed to a number of factors.  See Stone, supra note 54, at 298.  One author suggests, 
“The lack of prison or jail-based drug treatment service programs may prove catastrophic 
given the absolute increase in the number of persons incarcerated for drug-related offenses, 
combined with the high prevalence rate of co-occurring drug dependency/abuse and 
mental disorders.”  Id.  The author explains that these factors, combined with the continued 
use of jails and prisons as “mental health ‘treatment’ of a last or only resort for persons 
with severe mental disorders,” lead to the reasonable assumption that the prevalence rate 
of inmates with severe mental disorders will continue to rise.  Id.  Another factor that 
contributes to the disproportionate rate of mental illness in correctional facilities is the fact 
that people with a mental illness are more likely to be arrested than people without a 
mental illness for commission of the same offense.  Olinda Moyd, Mental Health And 
Incarceration:  What A Bad Combination, 7 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 201, 208 (2003) (“[P]ersons 
with mental illness have a sixty percent greater chance of being arrested than those who are 
not mentally ill but commit the same offense.”).  The author also explains that “the rising 
cost of managed health care, the population growth of jails and prisons, and the 
punishment of ‘quality of life’ crimes have contributed to the incarceration of thousands of 
people with mental illness.”  Id. 
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Many of these mentally ill inmates have histories of alcohol and drug 
abuse, as well as physical and sexual abuse.60  More specifically, inmates 
with mental illness are more than twice as likely to have suffered from 
physical abuse and almost four times as likely to have suffered from 
sexual abuse.61  In addition, a higher rate of mentally ill inmates 
experienced a period of homelessness in the year prior to their 
incarceration.62  This disparity is highest in federal prisons, where nearly 
six times as many mentally ill inmates were homeless at some time 
during the preceding year than other inmates.63  This disparity is 
dramatically higher in the number of federal inmates who were 
homeless at the time of the arrest, with the rate of homelessness being 
fifteen times higher for the mentally ill as compared to other federal 
inmates.64 
Mentally ill inmates face particular problems during their 
incarceration that are attributable to their illness, but are not affiliated 
with the illness itself.65  For example, a prisoner with a mental illness is 
                                                 
60 See Ditton, supra note 44, at 7.  For example, a study of the Cook County Jail in 
Chicago revealed that over one-third of the inmates with severe mental disorders had a 
drug-related disorder.  Stone, supra note 54, at 297; see also Moyd, supra note 59, at 208 
(explaining that many inmates enter correctional facilities with mental health-related 
factors, including histories of physical and mental abuse and extensive drug histories).  
More specifically, as compared to the general population, where twenty percent of adults 
with mental illness have a co-occurring problem with substance abuse, almost seventy-five 
percent of inmates with mental illness have co-occurring problems with drug and alcohol 
abuse.  Karen M. Abram & Linda A. Teplin, Co-Occurring Disorders Among Mentally Ill Jail 
Detainees:  Implications for Public Policy, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1036, 1039, 1044 (1991). 
61 Ditton, supra note 44, at 6.  The percentage of mentally ill inmates reporting physical 
abuse was twenty-seven percent, as compared to eleven percent of other inmates.  Id.  The 
percentage of mentally ill inmates reporting sexual abuse was fifteen percent, while only 
four percent of other inmates reported such abuse.  Id. 
62 See id. at 5. 
63 See id.  In federal prisons, 18.6% of mentally ill inmates reported being homeless in the 
year preceding their incarceration as compared to 3.2% of other inmates.  Id.  In state 
prisons, the percentage was 20.1% as compared to 8.8% of other inmates.  Id.  In local jails, 
the percentage was 30.3% as compared to 17.3% of other inmates.  Id. 
64 See id.  In federal prisons, 3.9% of mentally ill inmates reported being homeless at the 
time of arrest as compared to 0.3% of other inmates.  Id.  In state prisons, the percentage 
was 3.9% as compared to 1.2% of other inmates.  Id.  In local jails, the percentage was 6.9% 
as compared to 2.9% of other inmates.  Id. 
65 See Ogloff, Roesch & Hart, supra note 58; see also Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 
56 (explaining how mentally ill prisoners are vulnerable to exploitation and extortion).  
Other commentators have recognized the problems that mentally ill offenders have 
throughout the entire judicial process, including during the booking procedure.  See Marie 
L. Leahy, Booking Procedures for the Mentally Ill or Handicap Suspect:  Justice Undone, 29 NEW 
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 293, 327 (2003).  The author suggests that safeguards 
must be in place to ensure that suspects with mental illnesses are processed properly 
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considerably more likely than a non-mentally ill inmate to be a victim of 
physical or sexual assault while incarcerated.66  This is largely due to the 
vulnerability that mentally ill inmates have to pressure and intimidation 
by prison guards to “snitch” on other inmates and from coercion by 
other inmates to break prison rules.67  Also, when mentally ill inmates 
are faced with violence, anti-psychotic medications make them more 
vulnerable to attack because their reaction times are slowed and they 
cannot adequately defend themselves.68 
In addition to heightened risks associated with confinement, mental 
illness may also affect an inmate’s length of confinement.69  The 
                                                                                                             
because mentally challenged people may not be able to protect themselves and their 
constitutional rights.  Id.  One safeguard is to call upon a trained psychologist once a 
person with mental illness or handicap is arrested to assess the person and explain things 
in a way that the mentally challenged person can more easily understand.  Id.  The author 
notes that society is already beginning to acknowledge that mentally ill people have special 
needs, demonstrated by the creation of mental health courts.  Id.  However, changes still 
need to be made in order to protect mentally challenged people who are still “vulnerable 
targets in this judicial system.”  Id. 
66 See Dennis Cooley, Prison Victimization and the Informal Rules of Social Control, 4 FORUM 
ON CORR. RESEARCH 31 (1992); see also Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 57 (“[M]ale 
and female mentally disordered prisoners are disproportionately represented among the 
victims of rape.”).  In addition to the dangers that other inmates pose to mentally ill 
inmates, prison staff also contribute to unbearable conditions and physical dangers.  
Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, § 7.  The report described prison conditions in the most 
extreme cases as “truly horrific.”  Id. § 2.  For example, in some cases mentally ill inmates 
are “locked in segregation with no treatment at all; confined in filthy and beastly hot cells; 
left for days covered in feces they have smeared over their bodies; taunted, abused, or 
ignored by prison staff; given so little water during summer heat waves that they drink 
from their toilet bowls.”  Id.  Furthermore, “[s]uicidal prisoners are left naked and 
unattended for days on end in barren, cold observation cells.”  Id.  A prison expert recently 
described one unit in a prison as “medieval . . . cramped, unventilated, unsanitary . . . it 
will make some men mad and mad men madder.”  Id.  Such horrific treatment of mentally 
ill inmates may also lead to death, as the report notes that “[p]oorly trained correctional 
officers have accidentally asphyxiated mentally ill prisoners whom they were trying to 
restrain.”  Id. 
67 Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 56-57 (“[T]hey are intimidated by staff into 
snitching or they are manipulated by other prisoners into doing things that get them into 
deep trouble.”).  The report further notes that many inmates with mental illness try to 
avoid the trouble caused by intimidation and coercion by voluntarily isolating themselves 
in their cells.  Id. at 57.  However, this cannot always be avoided and clearly psychotic or 
chronically disturbed inmates “are called ‘dings’ and ‘bugs’ by other prisoners, and 
victimized.”  Id. 
68 Id. (“[Their] anti-psychotic medications slow their reaction times, which makes them 
more vulnerable to ‘blind-siding’ an attack from the side or from behind by another 
prisoner.”). 
69 See Ogloff, Roesch & Hart, supra note 58.  One factor that attributes to mentally ill 
inmates’ longer lengths of confinement is that mentally ill inmates are less likely to be 
placed in prison programs that make early release possible.  Stone, supra note 54, at 357 
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probability that a mentally ill inmate may receive early or gradual 
release from prison is ultimately reduced because the inmate’s untreated 
mental illness causes both individual and institutional problems which, 
in turn, worsen the inmate’s mental health functioning.70  In fact, 
mentally ill inmates serve a sentence approximately one full year longer 
on average than non-mentally ill prisoners.71  The Fourth Circuit 
recognized this problem, stating that mental illness, which a facility has 
refused or failed to treat, forms the basis for denying an inmate’s release 
                                                                                                             
(“[C]onditions also prevent inmates with severe mental disorders from obtaining access to 
prison programs or rehabilitation plans which could facilitate release and improve post-
release success.”).  Another factor is the initial placement of mentally ill offenders in higher 
security facilities.  See Robert D. Miller, The Continuum of Coercion:  Constitutional and 
Clinical Considerations in the Treatment of Mentally Disordered Persons, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 
1169, 1192-93 (1997). 
In a national survey of all state correctional systems, forty-eight of 
fifty-one responded that they use psychiatric diagnosis in placement 
decisions; twenty of fifty-one states use maximum security placements 
for seriously mentally ill inmates, regardless of their actual behavior.  
Some states bar seriously mentally ill inmates from many, if not all, 
minimum security facilities.  Twenty-two of the thirty states that have 
them prohibit inmates with major mental disorders, or those who are 
taking psychotropic medications, from participating in boot camp 
programs, perhaps the most significant advantage a corrections system 
can confer on an inmate.  Many of these policies, to be sure, are based 
on lack of mental health resources to monitor the effects of medication 
at many facilities.  Not discrimination per se, but the effect is the same.  
At a time when the incidence of mentally disordered inmates is 
growing rapidly, such discrimination is particularly problematic. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
70 Ogloff, Roesch & Hart, supra note 58, at 118.   One study describes the deterioration of 
mental health functioning, which reduces the chances of early release, as the “cycle of 
decompensation.”  Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 3.  The cycle begins when security 
staff places mentally ill inmates in solitary confinement because the staff views them as 
difficult or disruptive.  Id.  “The lack of human interaction and the limited mental stimulus 
of twenty-four-hour-a-day life in small, sometimes windowless segregation cells, coupled 
with the absence of adequate mental health services, dramatically aggravates the suffering 
of the mentally ill.”  Id.  As a result, some inmates’ mental state deteriorates so severely that 
they are required to be placed in a hospital for “acute psychiatric care.”  Id.  However, after 
they are stabilized, the inmates are returned to the same conditions they faced before, and 
the cycle of decompensation starts all over again.  Id.  The report concludes that “[t]he 
penal network is thus not only serving as a warehouse for the mentally ill, but, by relying 
on extremely restrictive housing for mentally ill prisoners, it is acting as an incubator for 
worse illness and psychiatric breakdowns.”  Id. 
71 Ditton, supra note 44, at 8.  Increased infractions of prison rules can contribute to 
denial of a mentally ill inmate’s early release and lead to a longer sentence.  See Stone, supra 
note 54, at 301 (“[I]nmates with schizophrenia were more likely than control group inmates 
to have infractions of any given type; have more infractions overall; have more violent 
infractions; have more days spent in ‘lock-up.’”). 
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on parole.72  Thus, given the prevalence of mental illness in correctional 
facilities, mentally ill inmates face additional dangers and problems 
during their incarceration.73 
However, treatment for these mentally ill offenders varies greatly 
among correctional facilities.74  A 2000 study by the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics evidences this variance of treatment for offenders, finding that 
almost three-quarters of all state prison facilities reported that they 
screen inmates during the intake process.75  Approximately the same 
number of facilities provided counseling or therapy to its inmates by 
trained mental health professionals, while a slightly higher number of 
                                                 
72 Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977) (explaining “psychological illness 
(arguably traced to a failure or refusal to treat) becomes the ground for the denial of release 
itself (i.e., parole)”) (cited by Ogloff, Roesch & Hart, supra note 58, at 117-18).  The court 
further noted that “deficiencies in health care and hygiene (including the provision of 
nominal psychological treatment) foster inmate frustration and resentment.  These 
emotions, in turn, ‘thwart the purported goal of rehabilitation,’ and ‘(jeopardize) the ability 
of inmates to assimilate into the population at large when ultimately released.’”  Id. 
73 In one article, the author describes how the problems mentally ill inmates face are 
attributable to the inmates’ poor adjustment to an incarceration environment, concluding 
that “[i]ncarceration has significant therapeutic implications for persons with severe mental 
disorders.”  Stone, supra note 54, at 299.  In every measure of adjustment, mentally ill 
inmates adapt to their incarceration more poorly than non-mentally ill inmates.  Id.  The 
gravest manifestation of mentally ill inmates’ poor adjustment to incarceration is suicide.  
Id.  “Maladaptation to incarceration by inmates with severe mental disorders also 
implicates other antitherapeutic outcomes, including the worsening of psychiatric 
symptoms and frequent, as well as intensive mental health hospitalization or treatment, 
exclusion from prison curricular programs, and disproportionate terms of incarceration 
relative to inmates without severe mental disorders.”  Id.  Mental illness also causes 
problems for prison staff, as well as the inmates, due to the difficulties the inmates have in 
adapting to incarceration.  See Lovell & Rhodes, supra note 5, at 40.  “These difficulties 
include disruptiveness, unpredictability, inability to follow orders, and the likelihood of 
being ostracized or victimized by fellow prisoners.”  Id.  Another commentator explains the 
reasons for disruptive behavior and problems prison personnel have with discipline.  See 
Danielle Drissel, Massachusetts Prison Mental Health Services: History, Policy and 
Recommendations, 87 MASS. L. REV. 106, 118 (2003).  The author explains that mental illness 
lessens the inmates’ ability to adjust to prison and the highly structured environment that 
is associated with such incarceration.  Id.  As a result, mentally ill inmates are significantly 
more likely to break prison rules than other inmates.  Id.  Furthermore, “[b]eyond the 
period of adjustment, an inmate’s mental health needs may be the cause of acts of violence 
and other ‘bad behavior.’”  Id.  In addition, “how an inmate responds to disciplinary 
action” may be influenced by his or her mental illness.  Id. 
74 See Allen J. Beck, Ph.D. & Laura M. Maruschak, Bureau of Justice Statistics: Special 
Report, Mental Health Treatment in State Prisons, 2000, available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/mhtsp00.pdf (2001).  This report is based on the 
2000 Census of State and Federal Adult Correctional Facilities, which included 84 federal 
facilities, 1,320 state facilities, and 260 private correctional facilities, which were in 
operation on June 30, 2000.  Id. at 1. 
75 Id. 
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facilities administered psychotropic medications to mentally ill 
inmates.76  However, only sixty-five percent of these facilities conducted 
psychiatric assessments on the prison inmates, and only sixty-six percent 
of the facilities assisted the inmates in obtaining mental health treatment 
upon release into the community.77  In addition, only slightly more than 
half of prison facilities provided twenty-four hour mental health care for 
its inmates.78  Finally, the study revealed that approximately two-thirds 
of all inmates who received medication, counseling, or other therapy 
were in facilities that did not specialize in treating mentally ill inmates.79 
Taking a closer look at these statistics, while nearly seventy percent 
of state correctional facilities screen inmates upon intake or provide 
psychiatric assessments, almost ten percent of all facilities in the year 
2000 provided no screening or treatment for mental illness at all.80  Even 
though screening and treatment may be available at a correctional 
facility, the inmate may never receive the benefit of medication or 
counseling.81  According to the study by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
since entering prison, four out of ten mentally ill state inmates have 
reported not receiving any treatment, including counseling or 
medication.82  The facilities that do offer some mental health care are 
                                                 
76 Id.  “Antipsychotic drugs are used to reduce psychomotor excitement, hallucinations, 
and delusions in patients with schizophrenia, acute mania, or organic psychosis.”  Stone, 
supra note 54, at 305. 
77 See Beck & Maruschak, supra note 74, at 1. 
78 Id. 
79 Id.  The exact statistics reported by the Bureau of Justice Statistics are as follows: 
Nearly 70% of facilities housing State prison inmates reported that, as a 
matter of policy, they screen inmates at intake; 65% conduct 
psychiatric assessments; 51% provide 24-hour mental health care; 71% 
provide therapy/counseling by trained mental health professionals; 
73% distribute psychotropic medications to their inmates; and 66% 
help released inmates obtain community mental health services.  
About two-thirds of all inmates receiving therapy/counseling or 
medications were in facilities that didn’t specialize in providing mental 
health services in confinement. 
Id. 
80 Id.  Overall, policies for screening and treatment of mental illness were reportedly 
higher in State confinement facilities at 95%, than by community-based facilities at 82%.  Id. 
at 2.  Although many facilities do not provide screening for mental illness, screening is 
essential for detecting mental health issues.  See Moyd, supra note 59, at 209.  “When mental 
health issues go undetected the results can be deadly.  Historically, inmates at the Jail have 
made suicide attempts by drinking disinfectant, overdosing on medications, hanging with 
bed clothing and self-inflicting skin lacerations.”  Id. 
81 See Ditton, supra note 44, at 10. 
82 See Beck & Maruschak, supra note 74, at 1.  Treatment options for mental illness, which 
many inmates never receive, include:  the use of antipsychotic and antidepressant drugs; 
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often ill equipped to handle inmates with severe psychiatric conditions.83  
The lack of understanding mental illness in general by prison personnel 
leads to ill treatment of offenders instead of adequate care of their mental 
conditions.84  Such poor treatment includes putting the mentally ill 
inmate in physical restraints, placing the inmate in solitary confinement, 
or subjecting the inmate to some other form of punishment.85  Thus, 
while mental illness is widespread in correctional facilities and these 
inmates face significant problems during their incarceration, if facilities 
are performing evaluations and providing treatment for these offenders 
at all, they are doing so inconsistently.86   
B. Eighth Amendment 
Despite the fact that the treatment needs of many mentally ill 
prisoners remain completely unmet, inmates have a constitutional right 
to mental, as well as physical, health care.87  This right originates in the 
Eighth Amendment, which prohibits the use of cruel and unusual 
punishment against prisoners during their confinement.88  The Eighth 
Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.”89  
The drafters of the Amendment had the principal concern of protecting 
prisoners from “torture and other barbar[ous] methods of 
                                                                                                             
psychotherapy; psychosurgery; and electroconvulsive therapy (ECT).  Stone, supra note 54, 
at 305. 
83 See LeRoy L. Kondo, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Issues, Analysis and Applications: 
Advocacy of the Establishment of Mental Health Specialty Courts in the Provision of Therapeutic 
Justice for Mentally Ill Offenders, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 373, 377 (2000).  “NAMI notes that 
correctional facilities are ill-equipped to provide adequate mental health care to mentally ill 
inmates with severe psychiatric illnesses.  Mentally ill inmates are frequently punished, 
physically restrained, or secluded in isolation cells because of the correctional staff’s lack of 
understanding regarding the nature of mental illness.”  Id.; see also Stone, supra note 54, at 
299 (“[M]any prisons and jails are inadequately prepared to meet the needs of inmates with 
severe mental disorders in order to prevent antitherapeutic maladaptation.”). 
84 See Kondo, supra note 83, at 377; see also Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, § 8. 
85 See Kondo, supra note 83, at 377; see also supra notes 7-21 and accompanying text for a 
disturbing example of jail guards’ treatment of a mentally ill inmate, Pamela Young (giving 
the reported facts of Young v. City of Augusta, 59 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 1995)). 
86 See Beck & Maruschak, supra note 74, at 1.  In the 2000 study, 155 state facilities 
reportedly had expertise in psychiatric confinement, but a majority of treatment for 
mentally ill offenders occurs in general confinement facilities.  Id.  Of the 155 specialized 
facilities, only twelve had mental health as their primary function, while 143 included 
mental health as part of other specialty functions.  Id. 
87 See F. COHEN, LEGAL ISSUES AND THE MENTALLY DISORDERED PRISONER (Nat’l Inst. of 
Corrections, 1988); see also Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977). 
88 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
89 Id. 
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punishment.”90  However, interpretation of the Amendment’s 
protections evolved to encompass “standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.”91  In Gregg v. Georgia,92 the Supreme 
Court stated that the “dignity of man” is an underlying principle of the 
Eighth Amendment and “punishment shall not involve the unnecessary 
and wanton infliction of pain.”93  As a result, the Court concluded that 
the Amendment’s protections include more than just inhumane 
punishment, but also inhumane conditions of confinement in prisons 
and jails.94  In order for conditions to be humane, a prisoner’s basic 
needs, such as food, clothing, and medical care, must be satisfied.95 
The Supreme Court first acknowledged a prisoner’s right to medical 
care in Estelle v. Gamble.96  The Estelle Court specifically considered the 
                                                 
90 Granucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishment Inflicted:  The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. 
REV. 839, 842 (1969); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 170 (1976) (quotations omitted). 
91 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.  The Court stated that the prohibitions of the Eighth 
Amendment are not confined “to ‘barbarous’ methods that were generally outlawed in the 
18th century.”  Id. at 171.  Instead, the Court explained that interpretation of the Eighth 
Amendment has been flexible and dynamic.  Id.  The Court explained that it has already 
been recognized that “a principle to be vital, must be capable of wider application than the 
mischief which gave it birth” and concluded that “the Clause forbidding ‘cruel and 
unusual’ punishments ‘is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public 
opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.’”  Id. (citations omitted). 
92 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
93 Id. at 173. 
94 See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349-50 (1981) (holding that inhumane prison 
conditions are unconstitutional).  In this case, inmates of a maximum security prison in 
Ohio brought a class action in Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against prison 
officials, alleging that double celling of inmates (keeping more than one inmate in a cell) 
was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.  Id. at 337.  The 
Court held that “[c]onditions of confinement, as constituting the punishment at issue, must 
not involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, nor may they be grossly 
disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting imprisonment.”  Id.  However, the 
Court ultimately held that double celling does not necessarily violate the Eighth 
Amendment.  Id. 
95 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (stating that prisoners have a right to 
“adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care”). 
96 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).  In that case, Gamble was an inmate who 
suffered a back injury while unloading cotton from a truck in November 1973.  Id. at 99.  
When he sought medical attention, he was given pain medication, a pass to remain in his 
cell, and an order to sleep on a lower bunk bed.  Id.  The guards refused to comply with the 
bed order.  Id.  In December, before the pain had subsided, Gamble’s cell pass was revoked 
and he was certified as able to perform light work.  Id. at 100.  Gamble complained that he 
was in too much pain to work, and was placed in segregation and subsequently taken 
before the prison disciplinary committee for his failure to work.  Id.  He was sent to see 
another doctor, who prescribed another medication.  Id.  However, the prescription was not 
filled for days because prison personnel lost it.  Id.  Through all of December and January, 
Gamble was kept in segregation.  Id. at 100-01.  At the end of January, Gamble was placed 
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adequacy of health care in prisons and held that failure to provide 
adequate medical care constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, 
thereby violating the Eighth Amendment, if it rises to the level of 
“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.”97  The 
Court reasoned that the government’s obligation to provide medical care 
arises from the basic principles of preserving human dignity and 
avoiding unnecessary infliction of pain.98  Because of incarceration, an 
inmate cannot care for himself and relies on prison personnel to meet his 
needs, including medical care.99  The Court found that failure to meet a 
                                                                                                             
in solitary confinement as punishment for his refusal to work.  Id.  Shortly thereafter, 
Gamble was hospitalized briefly for back and chest pains and placed on heart medication.  
Id.  When he requested to see another doctor for his pain, the guards refused his request for 
two days.  Id.  In all, Gamble made seventeen attempts to receive a proper diagnosis and 
treatment for his back injury.  Id. 
97 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.  The decision has been criticized by some commentators as 
failing to recognize the distinction between custodial and punitive functions of prisons that 
ultimately hurts, rather than helps, prison inmates.  See Genty, supra note 29, at 379-80.  
“Despite the noble goals of Estelle, however, the decision is fundamentally flawed and has 
had a detrimental impact upon the very prisoners it was intended to protect.”  Id. at 379.  
The author traces the problems to “the Court’s failure to take sufficient account of the 
realities of the modern prison.”  Id.  The idea of imprisonment encompasses the conditions 
under which confinement occurs, not just the confinement itself and its duration.  Id.  The 
author explains that “[p]risons are literally miniature cities in which births, deaths, and 
even marriages occur.  Prisons have their own governing structure, police force, industries, 
schools, medical facilities, housing complexes, and cemeteries.  Not all of these aspects of 
daily prison life fit comfortably within notions of ‘punishment.’”  Id. at 380. 
98 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102-03. 
The Amendment embodies “broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, 
civilized standards, humanity, and decency . . . ,” against which we 
must evaluate penal measures.  Thus, we have held repugnant to the 
Eighth Amendment punishments which are incompatible with “the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society” or which “involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
pain.”  These elementary principles establish the government’s 
obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by 
incarceration. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
99 Id. at 103.  This idea of reliance on prison personnel due to captivity is more 
thoroughly described in an article by Fred Cohen.  See Fred Cohen, Captives Right To Mental 
Health Care, 17 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 1-3 (1993) [hereinafter Cohen, Captives].  The author 
explains that a government assumes the responsibility “to preserve the health and life of a 
person when the government deprives that person of liberty,” meaning the “loss of 
freedom to move about at will.”  Id. at 1-2.  “A captive, by the very nature of involuntary 
confinement, and without reference to the rationale or objectives of the confinement, 
simply has no right of self-determined access to medical or mental health care.”  Id. at 2.  
Unless the government provides access to adequate care for sufficiently serious medical or 
psychological conditions, “the captive will experience needless suffering, possible 
deterioration or permanent harm, even death.”  Id.  The author explains that official 
custody creates an “affirmative governmental obligation under the Due Process Clause” 
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prisoner’s medical needs could result in unnecessary pain and suffering, 
or in some cases, even a torturous death.100  Thus, such a denial would 
constitute cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the 
Amendment.101  Therefore, the Estelle case created a two-part test to 
establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment regarding the adequacy 
of medical care:  (1) the medical needs of the inmate must be sufficiently 
serious, and (2) the treatment or lack of treatment must demonstrate 
deliberate indifference to the needs of the inmate.102 
While the Supreme Court has recognized prisoners’ rights to medical 
care, the Court has never specifically addressed the right to mental 
health treatment.103  However, lower courts have extended this right to 
the mentally ill.104  In Bowring v. Godwin,105 the Fourth Circuit in effect 
removed the distinction between physical and mental health care for 
Eighth Amendment purposes.106  The court reasoned that modern 
science has evolved to include mental illness among the conditions to be 
treated by medical means.107  The court stated, “Modern science has 
                                                                                                             
and the “rationale for this principle is simple.”  Id.  When a state government exercises its 
affirmative power to restrain a person’s liberty, that “renders him unable to care for 
himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs—e.g., food, 
clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety—it transgresses the substantive limits 
on state action set by the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause.”  Id. at 3. 
100 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04.  The Court stated that inmates are forced to rely on prison 
personnel to treat medical needs, and if the prison fails to provide treatment, “those needs 
will not be met.”  Id. at 103.  The Court noted that in the worst cases, failure to treat a 
medical need may cause “physical ‘torture or a lingering death,’ the evils of most 
immediate concern to the drafters of the Amendment.”  Id. (citations omitted).  
Furthermore, even in less serious cases, such a failure would result in pain and suffering, 
which would not serve any penological purpose.  Id.  “The infliction of such unnecessary 
suffering is inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency as manifested in modern 
legislation codifying the common-law view that ‘(i)t is but just that the public be required 
to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of his liberty, care for 
himself.’”  Id. at 103-04 (citations omitted). 
101 Id. at 104. 
102 Id.  For a more thorough discussion of both parts of the Estelle test, see infra Part II.C.1 
(explaining the serious medical need requirement) and Part II.C.2 (explaining the deliberate 
indifference requirement). 
103 See Ogloff, Roesch & Hart, supra note 58, at 119 (“Unfortunately, the Court has yet to 
decide a case that directly addresses the extent to which prison and jail inmates have the 
right to psychological or psychiatric assessment and treatment.”).  However, the Supreme 
Court and other appellate courts have decided other cases that “help elucidate the standard 
of psychiatric or psychological care required by correctional facilities.”  Id. 
104 See Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977). 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 47 (“[W]e see no underlying distinction between the right to medical care for 
physical ills and its psychological or psychiatric counterpart.”). 
107 Id. 
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rejected the notion that mental or emotional disturbances are the 
products of afflicted souls, hence beyond the purview of counseling, 
medication and therapy.”108  As a result, the Bowring court set up a test 
for determining an inmate’s constitutional right to mental health 
treatment.109  The court held that all prison inmates are entitled to 
psychiatric or psychological treatment according to the following factors:  
(1) a doctor or other health care provider, using ordinary skill, 
determines with reasonable certainty that a serious disease or injury is 
demonstrated by the inmate’s symptoms; (2) the disease is capable of 
considerable alleviation or can be cured; and (3) denial or delay of care 
could potentially cause further harm.110  The court further recognized 
that a prisoner’s right to treatment is limited to treatment that is not 
unreasonably costly or timely and which is medically necessary and not 
just desired by the prisoner.111 
Other courts have also held that no logical distinction exists between 
physical and mental health in terms of a right to treatment.112  Moreover, 
since the decision of Estelle, in all cases involving deliberate indifference 
to a prisoner’s need for mental health treatment, courts have held this 
indifference actionable under the Eighth Amendment.113  As a result, the 
                                                 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 47-48. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. (“The right to treatment is, of course, limited to that which may be provided upon 
a reasonable cost and time basis and the essential test is one of medical necessity and not 
simply that which may be considered merely desirable.”). 
112 See, e.g., Steele v. Shah, 87 F.3d 1266, 1269 (11th Cir. 1996); Torraco v. Maloney, 923 
F.2d 231, 235 (1st Cir. 1991); Seifullah v. Toombs, 940 F.2d 662, 662 (6th Cir. 1991); Wellman 
v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 272 (7th Cir. 1983); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 
1982); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 574 (10th Cir. 1980); Inmates of Allegheny County Jail 
v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 763 (3d Cir. 1979); Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47-48 (4th Cir. 
1977); Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 595 F. Supp. 1558 (D. Idaho 1984); Ruiz v. 
Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980), modified, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1983). 
113 Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 834 (11th Cir. 1990).  This case involved a prison 
inmate from Georgia, Charles Greason, who was convicted of aggravated assault for firing 
a gun at a neighbor’s house.  Id. at 831 n.5.  While incarcerated in Georgia, Greason 
committed suicide.  Id. at 831.  The personal representatives of Charles Greason’s estate 
brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) in the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Georgia.  Id.  The plaintiffs argued that Greason killed himself because 
prison officials and those who provided his mental health care were deliberately indifferent 
to his mental needs.  Id.  The plaintiffs claim that this deliberate indifference violated 
Greason’s  rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments.  Id.  The facts surrounding 
the plaintiff’s argument began when Greason was charged with aggravated assault and he 
pled guilty but mentally ill to the assault charges and received a prison sentence of five 
years.  Id. at 831.  After sentencing, he was taken to the Georgia Diagnostic and 
Classification Center (“GDCC”) for a mental health evaluation and any treatment that may 
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application of the deliberate indifference standard to serious mental 
disorders is now clearly ingrained in the judicial system, and the 
Constitution is violated when a prison fails or refuses to provide 
adequate mental health care to inmates.114   
C. The Estelle Test 
When an inmate is denied adequate mental health care, violating the 
Eighth Amendment, the inmate may bring an action under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983.115  This statute provides a civil cause of action when a person’s 
                                                                                                             
be needed.  Id.  After Greason’s arrival, GDCC received reports from professionals who 
had treated Greason in the past, which stated that he had been diagnosed as schizophrenic 
with suicidal tendencies and had been placed on anti-depressant medication.  Id. at 832.  
These reports were placed in Greason’s file.  Id.  Greason stayed at GDCC for two and a 
half months before being seen by a doctor.  Id.  At that time, a doctor spent just a few 
minutes with Greason and, without even reviewing Greason’s file or assessing his mental 
health status to determine his current potential for suicide, the doctor concluded that 
Greason’s condition had stabilized and that his medication should be discontinued.  Id.  
Soon after, Greason attempted suicide, which was reported to prison officials by Greason’s 
parents and two other inmates.  Id. at 832 n.8.  However, the prison officials did nothing in 
response to the suicide attempt.  Id. at 833.  Less than a month later, Greason was found 
dead in his cell; he had hung himself with a sweatshirt.  Id.  In defending against the action, 
the prison officials argued that prison inmates had no clear established constitutional right 
to psychiatric care.  Id.  The court dismissed this argument and stated that “every reported 
decision handed down after Estelle . . . recognized that deliberate indifference to an 
inmate’s need for mental health care is actionable on eighth amendment grounds.”  Id. at 
834.  The court further stated that “any reasonably competent prison counselor or 
administrator would realize that denying a prisoner needed psychotropic drugs might 
trigger liability under Estelle—just as any physician who declined to treat a gangrenous 
infection with antibiotics might reasonably expect a constitutional challenge.”  Id.  The 
court further recognized that Estelle protects inmates beyond the administration of 
medication.  Id.  The Greason court went on to quote the district court: “Even if this case 
involved failure to provide psychotherapy or psychological counselling [sic] alone, the 
court would still conclude that the psychiatric care was sufficiently similar to medical 
treatment to bring it within the embrace of Estelle.”  Id. 
114 Connie M. Mayer, Unique Mental Health Needs of HIV-Infected Women Inmates: What 
Services Are Required Under the Constitution and the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 6 WM. & 
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 215, 232 (1999). 
115 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).  The statute provides, in part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought 
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s 
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a 
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. 
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constitutional rights are deprived.116  To prevail on a § 1983 claim, two 
requirements must be satisfied.117  First, the violation must be 
“committed by a person acting under color of state law.”118  Because state 
prison personnel are state employees, they satisfy the “acting under 
color of state law” requirement for § 1983 claims.119  Second, the violation 
must deprive a person of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 
the Constitution or laws of the United States.”120  Thus, an inmate must 
prove that he suffered a constitutional violation.121  The Supreme Court 
has held that a violation of an inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights is 
actionable under § 1983.122  Therefore, to bring a § 1983 claim under the 
Eighth Amendment, an inmate must satisfy the two-prong test of Estelle, 
proving both a serious medical need and deliberate indifference on the 
part of the state actor.123 
                                                                                                             
Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on other grounds.  In this case, an 
inmate of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, a Nebraska prison, ordered 
hobby materials through the mail.  Id. at 529.  After being delivered to the prison, the 
packages containing the hobby materials were lost when prison officials failed to perform 
the normal procedure for receipt of mail packages.  Id. at 530.  The inmate brought an 
action in Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the prison officials to recover 
the value of the hobby materials, claiming that the prison officials had negligently lost his 
hobby materials and thereby deprived him of his property without due process of law in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id.; see also Alford v. Haner, 333 F.3d 972, 975-76 
(9th Cir. 2003). 
118 Parratt, 451 U.S. at 530. 
119 Id. at 535-36.  Municipalities and other forms of local government may also satisfy the 
color of law requirement of a § 1983 claim.  See Christy P. Johnson, Mental Health Care 
Policies in Jail Systems:  Suicide and the Eighth Amendment, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1227, 1236-37 
(2002). 
120 Parratt, 451 U.S. at 535. 
121 Id. 
122 See Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).  In this case, female employees 
of the Department of Social Services and the Board of Education of the City of New York 
brought a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the city and other individuals 
for compelling pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before such leaves 
were required for medical reasons.  Id. 
123 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.  One author describes a three-step process which enables a jail 
inmate to sue a municipality or other local government under § 1983 for a violation of the 
jail inmate’s constitutional rights: 
Section 1983 enables individuals to sue state actors, such as 
municipalities, for constitutional violations.  Plaintiffs must satisfy 
three requirements to bring successful section 1983 actions.  The first 
element of a section 1983 claim requires plaintiffs to sue only 
“persons” for constitutional deprivations.  Municipalities and other 
local government units are persons within the meaning of section 1983.  
Therefore, in a section 1983 action, plaintiffs can sue the municipality 
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1.  Serious Medical Need 
While Estelle set forth the test for constitutionally mandated care, the 
Court failed to define one part of its test—”serious medical need.”124  
However, numerous lower courts have accepted the definition of 
“serious medical need” set forth by the First Circuit in Gaudreault v. 
Municipality of Salem, Massachusetts.125  In Gaudreault, the First Circuit 
defined serious medical need as a need that “has been diagnosed by a 
physician as mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a 
lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s 
attention . . . .  The ‘seriousness’ of an inmate’s needs may also be 
determined by reference to the effect of the delay of treatment.”126  In 
addition to a physician’s diagnosis or obvious need for a doctor’s 
attention, the treatment must be necessary and not just desirable or 
helpful.127  Thus, two ways of establishing whether a serious medical 
                                                                                                             
responsible for the jail that allegedly violated the inmate’s 
constitutional rights. 
 The second element of a section 1983 claim requires plaintiffs to 
prove that the defendant was acting under the authority of state law 
when the constitutional violation occurred.  Municipalities are 
responsible for administering state law.  Municipalities act under 
authority of state law when they create or sanction policies for the 
administration of jails.  Therefore, the Supreme Court has held that 
these municipalities are liable under section 1983 for endorsing a 
policy that violates an inmate’s constitutional rights. 
 The third element of a section 1983 claim requires plaintiffs to 
prove that the inmate suffered a constitutional violation.  The Supreme 
Court recognizes that a violation of an inmate’s Eighth Amendment 
rights is sufficient to successfully bring a section 1983 claim.  The Court 
has also made clear that inadequate medical care policies for inmates 
violate their Eighth Amendment rights. 
See Johnson, supra note 119, at 1236-38 (citations omitted). 
124 Fred Cohen & Joel Dvoskin, Inmates with Mental Disorders: A Guide to Law and Practice, 
16 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 339, 341 (1992). 
125 Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, Mass., 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990). 
126 Id. at 208.  Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980), sets forth one of the 
earlier formulations of the test used by the First Circuit.  The definition set forth by the First 
Circuit in Gaudreault has been criticized by commentators.  See infra Part III; see also Cohen 
& Dvoskin, supra note 124, at 341.  The authors criticized the definition used by the First 
Circuit explaining as follows: 
[T]he obvious-to-a-layman factor is oft repeated but little explained.  A 
bone protruding through the skin is one kind of layman’s call, while a 
mental illness is very different.  Behavior that one person views as 
‘bad’ another characterizes as ‘mad’ and, without more, who may say 
who is correct? 
Id. 
127 See Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977). 
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need exists are as follows:  (1) evidence of a prior diagnosis and 
treatment; or (2) the obviousness of the need for treatment.128 
Using this definition of “serious,” evidence of a prior diagnosis or 
treatment may establish a serious medical need.129  However, that 
diagnosis must be made by a “mental health professional—especially a 
psychiatrist or clinical psychologist,” and the professional must 
determine that the illness diagnosed is serious.130  The courts give great 
deference to the diagnoses of mental health professionals.131  In addition, 
some judicial formulations of “serious medical need” are as follows: 
The (diagnostic) test is one of medical or psychiatric 
necessity. . . .  Minor aches, pains, or distress will not 
establish such necessity. . . .  A desire to achieve 
rehabilitation from alcohol or drug abuse, to lose weight 
to simply look better or in order to feel better, will not 
suffice. . . .  A diagnosis based on professional judgment 
and resting on some acceptable diagnostic tool, e.g., 
D.S.M.-III(R), is presumptively valid.132 
Following these formulations, courts have held that mere 
depression, behavioral problems, and emotional problems do not qualify 
as serious mental illnesses.133  On the other hand, acute depression, 
paranoid schizophrenia, and nervous collapse have been identified as 
                                                 
128 Gaudreault, 923 F.2d at 208. 
129 Id.  However, even if an inmate receives a diagnosis of a serious mental illness, such a 
diagnosis does not ensure that a court will determine that a serious medical need existed.  
See Cohen & Dvoskin, supra note 124, at 341.  Instead, the court may choose to rely on a 
contradictory opinion by another mental health professional.  See id. (explaining that “even 
if one doctor diagnoses something as serious, that does not prevent a second medical 
opinion to the contrary and one upon which a correctional decisionmaker reasonably might 
choose to rely”). 
130 Cohen & Dvoskin, supra note 124, at 341.  The authors further explain the process that 
medical professionals go through when making such a determination.  Id.  First, the 
professional refers to professional training and norms.  Id.  At the same time, however, the 
professional should keep in mind that only serious disorders relate to constitutional 
requirements for treatment.  Id.  Finally, the professional should realize “that among the 
critical components of that decision are the amount of pain associated with the disorder 
and the consequences of a delay in providing appropriate care.”  Id. 
131 See id.  The Court accepted the use of such deference to mental health professionals’ 
judgment in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).  See id. at 341 n.35. 
132 Id. at 341.  Although judicial formulations exist, “[i]n truth, what is or is not viewed as 
a disorder, and then as serious, will be the subject of the battle of experts.”  Id. 
133 Id. (citing F. COHEN, LEGAL ISSUES AND THE MENTALLY DISORDERED PRISONER 59-60 
(Nat’l. Inst. of Corrections, 1988)). 
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sufficiently serious disorders.134  Thus, the terminology used by a mental 
health professional for a diagnosis can mean the difference between 
crossing the line from a mere problem to a serious medical need.135 
In addition to evidence of a prior diagnosis and treatment, a court 
may determine that a serious medical need exists if it is sufficiently 
obvious to a reasonable person.136  A serious medical need may be 
sufficiently obvious if it results in a physical manifestation that can be 
seen by a reasonable person.137  For example, blood seeping from a 
wound would be a physical manifestation that a reasonable person could 
perceive as warranting medical attention.138  Courts permit physical 
                                                 
134 Id. at 341-42 (“In accepting or rejecting such diagnostic categories, courts are strongly 
influenced by accounts of the inmate’s behavior.”); see also Robert E. v. Lane, 530 F. Supp. 
930, 939 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
135 See Cohen, Captives, supra note 99.  The author points out that “it is actually the 
clinicians’ choice of the diagnostic terminology which will move these cases from no care to 
discretionary care or to mandated care.”  Id.  This issue of diagnostic control by doctors was 
also explained in another article.  See Cohen & Dvoskin, supra note 124, at 341.  The authors 
note that medical professionals serve as the “gatekeeper[s] for entry into the world of 
disease.”  Id. (citing F. Cohen, The Right to Treatment, A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO TREATING 
THE INCARCERATED MALE SEX OFFENDER 155, 157 (B.K. Schwartz, ed., Nat’l Inst. of 
Corrections, 1988)).  The concept of “‘disease’ is traditionally associated with pathology of 
tissue.”  Id.  However, within the framework of mental illness or disease, “it more nearly 
resembles a logical or theoretical construct which is not demonstrably valid or invalid.  
Thus, the various diagnostic categories of mental disease and disorders, as well as 
individual diagnosis, are in the hands of doctors and other mental health professionals.”  
Id. 
136 See Johnson, supra note 119, at 1248. 
137 Id.; see also Cohen & Dvoskin, supra note 124, at 341 (“A bone protruding through the 
skin is one kind of layman’s call, while a mental illness is very different.”). 
138 See Johnson, supra note 119, at 1248.  Although a reasonable person can detect a 
physical ailment, courts may still apply the deliberate indifference standard inconsistently.  
See Thirty-Second Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, Substantive Rights Retained By 
Prisoners, 91 GEO. L. R. 887, 907 n.2798 (2003).  For example, some courts have found 
deliberate indifference in cases where inmates have physical ailments.  See, e.g., Hughes v. 
Joliet Corr. Ctr., 931 F.2d 425, 427-28 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding deliberate indifference because 
inmate alleged that prison officials denied him crutches while recovering from spinal 
injury, and inmate was later diagnosed as paraplegic by specialist); Evans v. Dugger, 908 
F.2d 801, 802-04 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (finding deliberate indifference because 
prison officials failed to provide reasonable accommodation for partially paraplegic inmate 
and confiscated braces, crutches, and orthopedic shoes); La Faut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389, 392-
94 (4th Cir. 1987) (finding deliberate indifference because prison officials failed to provide 
an inmate with adequate treatment for a kidney infection and a broken leg, adequate 
rehabilitation therapy, and handicap bar in inmate’s cell or in carpentry shop where inmate 
worked).  On the other hand, courts have also failed to find that prison officials acted with 
deliberate indifference when inmates had physical ailments.  See, e.g., Dunigan v. 
Winnebago County, 165 F.3d 587, 592 (7th Cir. 1999) (no deliberate indifference found 
because prison officials were attentive to plaintiff’s medical needs during three month 
period of fatal illness; focus on lapses in care during final weekend of prisoner’s life 
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manifestations, in the medical context, to be presumed sufficiently 
obvious to a reasonable person.139 
While a mental illness may be more difficult to detect than a physical 
illness, a mental illness may become sufficiently obvious to a reasonable 
person if it manifests itself physically in the inmate’s behavior.140  This 
visible indication may be in the form of bizarre or self-destructive 
behavior, such as masturbating publicly.141  Thus, if an inmate exhibits 
such behavior, it would be obvious to a reasonable person that the 
inmate requires the attention of a mental health professional.142  
Therefore, for an inmate to prevail on a § 1983 claim, under the First 
Circuit’s definition in Gaudreault, first a showing must be made of a 
serious medical need, either by evidence of a prior diagnosis and 
treatment or by a showing that the need is obvious to a reasonable 
person.143   
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit set forth a different definition 
for “serious medical need” in 1992.144  The court described “serious 
medical need” as follows:  
                                                                                                             
distorts significant evidence that prison officials provided adequate medical care); 
McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1997) (no deliberate indifference found 
toward medical needs of prisoner when prison officials required that inmate undergo 
therapy for tuberculosis without his consent); Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 167 (4th Cir. 
1995) (no deliberate indifference found when inmate deprived of wheelchair because 
prison psychologist recommended removal of objects that inmate could use in violent 
manner, and prison officials had no subjective knowledge of deprivation); LeMaire v. 
Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1459 (9th Cir. 1993) (no deliberate indifference found when outer door 
of quiet cell kept open or intercom system maintained between quiet cell and guard cell to 
afford inmate access to medical services); Donald v. Wilson, 847 F.2d 1191, 1194 (6th Cir. 
1988) (no deliberate indifference found when prisoner’s prosthesis was temporarily 
confiscated because prosthesis was not medically necessary, prisoner was given crutches, 
and prisoner had used prosthesis at another prison to carry contraband and as a weapon). 
139 See Johnson, supra note 119, at 1248.  The author explains how the courts allow such a 
presumption: “Courts routinely permit such presumptions in the medical context, 
reasoning that medical illness may manifest itself physically, thereby allowing a reasonable 
person to perceive the need for treatment.  For example, a broken bone protruding from the 
skin is sufficiently obvious to warrant medical attention.”  Id. at 1249. 
140 Id. 
141 Id.  For a description of the forms that bizarre or self-destructive behavior may take, 
see Lovell & Rhodes, supra note 5, at 41. 
142 See Johnson, supra note 119, at 1250. 
143 Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, Mass., 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990). 
144 See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1992).  In this case, an inmate in an 
Arizona state prison, John McGuckin, brought a pro se § 1983 action against several prison 
medical personnel at the Arizona Department of Corrections alleging that the defendants 
were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.  Id. at 1052.  McGuckin had 
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A “serious” medical need exists if the failure to treat a 
prisoner’s condition could result in further significant 
injury or the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
pain”. . . . Either result is not the type of “routine 
discomfort [that] is ‘part of the penalty that criminal 
offenders pay for their offenses against society’”. . . .  
The existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or 
patient would find important and worthy of comment or 
treatment; the presence of a medical condition that 
significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or 
the existence of chronic and substantial pain are 
examples of indications that a prisoner has a “serious” 
need for medical treatment.145 
Using either the definition of the First Circuit in Gaudreault, or the 
definition used by the Ninth Circuit, once a serious medical need has 
been established, the second prong of Estelle must be met—that the 
personnel of the correctional institution were deliberately indifferent to 
the inmate’s serious medical need.146 
2.  Deliberate Indifference 
The state of mind that establishes culpability under Estelle is 
“deliberate indifference” to an inmate’s serious medical need.147  The 
                                                                                                             
suffered a back injury that required surgery, but he did not receive the needed surgery 
until he filed the § 1983 claim, which was over three years after the initial injury.  Id. at 
1061-62. 
145 Id. at 1059-60 (citations omitted). 
146 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). 
147 Id.  One author notes: 
One of the most intellectual-appearing discussions of deliberate 
indifference, which culminates in the most defense-oriented of 
definitions, is by Judge Richard Posner in Duckworth v. Franzen.  
After marking off negligence, recklessness and deliberateness as the 
three traditional mental elements to be consulted in order to locate the 
appropriate space for deliberate indifference, Judge Posner states: 
 If the word “punishment” in cases of prisoner mistreatment is to 
retain a link with normal usage, the infliction of suffering on prisoners 
can be found to violate the Eighth Amendment only if that infliction is 
either deliberate, or reckless in the criminal law sense.  Gross 
negligence is not enough.  Unlike criminal recklessness it does not 
import danger so great that knowledge of the danger can be inferred; 
and we remind that the “indifference” to the prisoner’s welfare must 
be “deliberate” . . . implying such knowledge. 
Cohen, Captives, supra note 99, at 24 (citing Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652-53 (7th 
Cir. 1985)). 
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Supreme Court noted that in order for an inmate to bring an actionable 
claim, the inmate must allege acts or omissions on the part of prison 
officials that are sufficiently harmful to show deliberate indifference.148  
The Court further stated that only indifference that offends developing 
decency standards violates the Eighth Amendment.149  However, the 
Court failed to clearly define what constitutes deliberate indifference.150   
The lack of guidance by the Estelle Court led to a temporary split 
among the circuits and an inconsistent application of the deliberate 
indifference standard.151  While the lower courts generally claimed to 
apply a recklessness standard to the deliberate indifference test, the 
courts split as to whether an objective or subjective recklessness standard 
should be applied.152  For example, in Wilks v. Young,153 the Seventh 
Circuit recognized that deliberate indifference is more than “inattention 
or inadvertence.”154  “[A]ctual intent or reckless disregard” is required.155  
The court further defined “reckless” as when a defendant “disregards a 
substantial risk of danger that either is known to him or would be apparent 
to a reasonable person in his position.”156  Using this definition, liability can 
be imposed when the defendant subjectively knew of the risk of harm 
and in circumstances where the defendant had only objective knowledge 
                                                 
148 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. 
149 Id.  More specifically, the Court stated that “[i]n order to state a cognizable claim, a 
prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate 
indifference to serious medical needs.  It is only such indifference that can offend ‘evolving 
standards of decency’ in violation of the Eighth Amendment.”  Id. 
150 See Cohen, Captives, supra note 99, at 22.  The author notes that while the Court did not 
define the phrase, the Court did make some effort to describe what “deliberate 
indifference” is not, including the inadvertent failure to provide adequate care.  Id.  
Therefore, “a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a 
medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth 
Amendment.  Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely 
because the victim is a prisoner.”  Id. (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06). 
151 Mayer, supra note 114, at 236. 
152 Id.  The disparity between the circuits regarding the recklessness standard can be seen 
in the differing decisions of Wilks v. Young, 897 F.2d 896, 898 (7th Cir. 1990) and LaMarca v. 
Turner, 995 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1993). 
153 897 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1990). 
154 Id. at 898.  In this case, James E. Wilks, a former inmate at the Waupun Correctional 
Institution in Wisconsin, filed a civil action for money damages and injunctive relief under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin after suffering 
three personal assaults by a co-inmate at the facility.  Id. at 897.  Wilks alleged that his 
Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment had been violated 
by the prison’s failure to implement existing prison policies, which may have served to 
prevent the assaults.  Id. 
155 Id. at 898 (citing Benson v. Cady, 761 F.2d 335, 339 (7th Cir. 1985)). 
156 Id. (citing Benson, 761 F.2d at 339) (emphasis in original). 
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of that risk.157  The court further identified the circumstances in which an 
objective standard could be applied:  when the defendant had an 
objective risk of harm and that risk was substantial.158  Thus, the Seventh 
Circuit applied an objective standard to the culpability requirement 
when the risk of harm was substantial.159 
On the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit also applied a recklessness 
standard to deliberate indifference, but reached the opposite 
conclusion.160  In LaMarka v. Turner,161 the court stated that in order to 
establish deliberate indifference, an inmate “must prove that the official 
possessed knowledge both of the infirm condition and of the means to 
cure that condition, ‘so that a conscious, culpable refusal to prevent the 
harm can be inferred from the defendant’s failure to prevent it.’”162  
Thus, the court concluded that deliberate indifference can be shown only 
when actual knowledge can be proved.163  Therefore, the Eleventh 
Circuit required subjective knowledge, similar to the standard used in 
criminal law, rather than a civil law objective standard employed by the 
Seventh Circuit.164 
In 1994, the Supreme Court resolved the split among the circuits as 
to whether a subjective or objective recklessness standard should be 
applied to the deliberate indifference test with the decision of Farmer v. 
Brennan.165  In that case, Dee Farmer alleged that federal prison officials 
                                                 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 898 n.3 (“An objective knowledge of a risk of harm by itself, however, is not 
enough to impose liability under the Eighth Amendment.  As an additional requirement, 
the risk must be substantial.”). 
159 Id. at 898. 
160 See LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1993). 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 1536 (citations omitted).  The court further clarified, “Thus, if an official attempts 
to remedy a constitutionally deficient prison condition, but fails in that endeavor, he cannot 
be deliberately indifferent unless he knows of, but disregards, an appropriate and sufficient 
alternative.”  Id. 
163 Id.  Ten inmates of Glades Correctional Institution in Florida brought a § 1983 action 
against a former superintendent of the institution.  Id. at 1529.  The suit originated in 1982 
when Anthony LaMarca, an inmate at the prison, “filed a handwritten pro se complaint in 
the district court stating that he had ‘been countlessly approached, threatened with 
physical violence and assaulted by other inmates at [GCI] because [he] refused to 
participate in homosexual activities, or pay [for] protection to be left alone.’”  Id. at 1530-31.  
LaMarca alleged that the prison offered “a severe lack of protection” and that “the 
institution seem[ed] unable or unwilling to handle the situation.”  Id. at 1531. 
164 Id. at 1535-36. 
165 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).  While the decision of Farmer resolved 
the split among the circuits as to whether a subjective or objective recklessness standard 
should be applied to the deliberate indifference test, the decision did not resolve the 
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violated the Eighth Amendment by their deliberate indifference to his 
safety.166  Farmer was diagnosed by medical personnel of the Bureau of 
Prisons as a transsexual.167  Farmer, who was biologically male, wore 
women’s clothing, underwent hormonal therapy, received breast 
implants, and had an unsuccessful testicle-removal surgery.168  Farmer 
was placed in a prison’s general population.169  Within two weeks, 
Farmer was beaten and raped by another inmate.170  Farmer claimed that 
by placing him in “general population despite knowledge that the 
penitentiary had a violent environment and a history of inmate assaults, 
and despite knowledge that [he], as a transsexual who ‘projects feminine 
characteristics,’ would be particularly vulnerable to sexual attack” by 
inmates, constituted deliberate indifference to Farmer’s safety, and thus 
                                                                                                             
inconsistent application of the test in all mental health cases.  See Thirty-Second Annual 
Review of Criminal Procedure: Substantive Rights Retained by Prisoners, 91 GEO. L. R. 887, 908 
n.2799 (May 2003).  For example, in some cases regarding deliberate indifference to a 
mental health need, both before and after the Farmer decision, courts have found that such 
grounds are actionable as a violation of an inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights.  See, e.g., 
Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 834 (11th Cir. 1990) (claim stated for failure to provide 
psychotropic medication); Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 272 (7th Cir. 1983) (claim 
stated for failure to attend to mental health needs); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 
(9th Cir. 1982) (same); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 574 (10th Cir. 1980) (same); Inmates of 
Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 763 (3d Cir. 1979) (same); Bowring v. 
Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47-48 (4th Cir. 1977) (same); cf. Young v. City of Augusta, 59 F.3d 
1160, 1171-72 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that the city’s failure to adequately train guards to 
accommodate mentally ill prisoners represented deliberate indifference to inmate’s mental 
health).  On the other hand, some courts have failed to find deliberate indifference to an 
inmate’s mental health needs in certain cases, both before and after the decision of Farmer.  
See, e.g., Estate of Novack v. County of Wood, 226 F.3d 525, 530 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
the deliberate indifference standard was not met when an inmate committed suicide 
because jail personnel were subjectively unaware that the inmate posed high suicide risk 
and when there was no pattern of suicides to demonstrate that the county was aware of 
inadequate mental illness treatment policies); Gregoire v. Class, 236 F.3d 413, 419 (8th Cir. 
2000) (holding that deliberate indifference was not established when a prison manager did 
not immediately respond to a prisoner’s suicide threat when the manager had no previous 
reason to believe the prisoner was suicidal); Sibley v. LeMaire, 184 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir. 
1999) (holding that there was no deliberate indifference when officer failed to call a doctor 
for worsening prisoner’s mental health); Torraco v. Maloney, 923 F.2d 231, 234 (1st Cir. 
1991) (holding that no deliberate indifference was demonstrated in suicide case). 
166 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 829. 
167 Id.  A transsexual is one who has “‘[a] rare psychiatric disorder in which a person feels 
persistently uncomfortable about his or her anatomical sex,’ and who typically seeks 
medical treatment, including hormonal therapy and surgery, to bring about a permanent 
sex change.”  Id. (citing AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE 
1006 (1989) and AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL 
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 74-75 (3d rev. ed. 1987)). 
168 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 829. 
169 Id. at 830. 
170 Id. 
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violated the Eighth Amendment.171  However, the Court held that the 
definition of deliberate indifference was more closely aligned with the 
definition used in criminal law.172   
The Court held that prison personnel cannot be found liable for 
violating the Eighth Amendment for subjecting an inmate to inhumane 
conditions of confinement unless they know of and ignore an excessive 
risk to the inmate’s safety or health.173  The Court further clarified that 
the prison official must not only be aware of certain facts from which one 
could draw the inference that a substantial risk of serious harm existed, 
but must also draw such an inference.174  As a result of the Farmer 
decision, in order to establish deliberate indifference, an inmate must 
prove that prison officials subjectively, or in other words actually, knew 
of the inmate’s serious mental health need and chose to ignore it.175  
                                                 
171 Id. at 831.  Mentally ill inmates are particularly vulnerable to physical and sexual 
attacks by other inmates.  See Cooley, supra note 4, at 31; see also Human Rights Watch, 
supra note 1, at 57 (noting that “male and female mentally disordered prisoners are 
disproportionately represented among the victims of rape”).  This report further describes 
how mentally ill inmates are vulnerable to exploitation and extortion.  Id. at 56. 
172 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.  Some commentators have criticized using the intent-based 
consideration of criminal law.  See Genty, supra note 29, at 381.  One author explains that 
focusing on intent is useful in deciding when a custodial duty of care has been breached, 
“but an intent-based analysis is ill-suited for determining what amounts to cruel and 
unusual punishment.  The result of the attempt to fit all aspects of incarceration into an 
intent-based framework has been an unwieldy and unworkable set of contextual standards 
developed by an increasingly fragmented Court.”  Id. 
173 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 
174 Id.  The subjective standard has been criticized by commentators as making claims of 
psychological deprivation nearly impossible to prove.  See Holly Boyer, Home Sweet Hell: 
An Analysis of the Eighth Amendment’s ‘Cruel and Unusual Punishment’ Clause as Applied to 
Supermax Prisons, 32 SW. U. L. REV. 317, 332-33 (2003) (citing Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, 
Regulating Prisons of the Future:  A Psychological Analysis of Supermax and Solitary 
Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 477, 542 (1997)).  “Because psychological 
conditions are usually hidden in the minds of the inmates, applying the subjective prong to 
condition-in-confinement cases would require a prison official to have the requisite 
training to identify and diagnose psychological conditions.”  Id. at 333.  However, prison 
guards lack psychological expertise, making awareness almost impossible.  Id.  “By virtue 
of the prison guards’ deficiency, courts continually hold guards to a lesser standard in 
recognizing these conditions.  Thus, while psychological deprivations are nonetheless as 
serious as other, visible or tangible, deprivations, the success of such claims is significantly 
hindered.”  Id. 
175 See Mayer, supra note 114, at 237.  “Whether an official has knowledge of a particular 
need, however, is a question of fact that can be resolved in favor of the inmate if the trier of 
fact could conclude that the official must have known of the need from the very fact that it 
was so obvious.”  Id. 
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D. Inconsistent Standards for Constitutionally Acceptable Mental Health 
Treatment 
While it is established that a mentally ill prisoner may bring an 
action against a correctional facility for deliberate indifference to a 
serious mental health need, lower courts have not established consistent 
legal requirements for adequate mental health care.176  The extent of the 
disparity is demonstrated in Ruiz v. Estelle177 and Estate of Novack ex rel. 
Turbin v. County of Wood.178  
In Ruiz v. Estelle, inmates brought a claim against a Texas prison for 
inadequate mental health care and treatment.179  The Federal District 
Court for the Southern District of Texas found that almost all the 
“treatment” that mentally ill inmates received was the administration of 
psychotropic medications, used basically to control or subdue the 
inmates.180  “Other options, such as counseling, group therapy, 
individual psychotherapy, or assignment to constructive, therapeutic 
activities are rarely, if ever, available on the units.”181  As a result, many 
mentally ill inmates resorted to suicide attempts and self-mutilation as 
                                                 
176 Johnson, supra note 119, at 1236 n.54.  Some commentators have argued that, although 
some courts have provided that inmates have substantive rights to at least minimal care, 
limitations imposed by the Supreme Court may pose a barrier for challenging inadequate 
care.  Joel A. Dvoskin, et al., Note:  Powell v. Coughlin and the Application of the Professional 
Judgment Rule to Prison Mental Health, 19 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 108, 110 
(1995).  “[T]he primary limitation is that the actions of state officials (both clinicians and 
administrators) shall be presumed valid, and in general the courts should defer to the 
‘professional judgment’ of ‘qualified mental health professionals.’”  Id.  Therefore, 
limitations on challenging minimum health care may contribute to inconsistencies among 
correctional facilities.  Id. 
177 Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1339 (S.D. Tex. 1980), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 679 
F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982). 
178 Id.; Estate of Novack ex rel. Turbin v. County of Wood, 226 F.3d 525 (7th Cir. 2000).  
The Ruiz case was initiated in June of 1972, when David Ruiz, an inmate of the Texas 
Department of Corrections (“TDC”), filed a lawsuit against the Director of TDC, pursuant 
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for alleged violations of his 
constitutional rights.  Ruiz, 503 F. Supp. at 1275.  Later, Ruiz’s suit was consolidated with 
the suits of seven other TDC inmates.  Id. 
179 Id. at 1332. 
180 Id. (“Professional treatment personnel are virtually non-existent on the units.  
‘Treatment’ there consists almost exclusively of the administration of medications, usually 
psychotropic drugs, to establish control over disturbed inmates.”). 
181 Id.  “Essentially, an inmate with a mental disorder is ignored by unit officers until his 
condition becomes serious.  When this occurs, he is medicated excessively.”  Id.  The court 
further explained that when a mental condition became so severe, the inmate was 
sometimes shipped to a prison treatment center, which resulted in little more than 
medication.  Id.  The court characterized shipping mentally ill inmates to the treatment 
center as “warehousing.”  Id. 
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desperate cries for help.182  However, prison security staff often viewed 
these behaviors as attempts to “manipulate the system” and punished 
the mentally ill inmates, rather than making arrangements for mental 
health professionals to counsel or supervise them.183 
The district court specified the following six requirements of a 
constitutionally acceptable mental health treatment program for prisons:  
(1) the prison must have a systematic program of screenings and 
evaluations of prisoners in order to identify those who need mental 
health treatment; (2) treatment for prisoners must entail more than just 
segregation and close supervision; (3) the prison must employ enough 
trained mental health professionals to be able to identify and treat the 
mentally ill in an individualized manner; (4) the treating professionals 
must keep accurate, complete, and confidential records of the mental 
health treatment process; (5) prisoners cannot be treated with 
prescriptions for behavior-altering medications in dangerous amounts, 
by dangerous methods, or without acceptable supervision and periodic 
evaluations; and (6) the prison must have a program for the 
identification, treatment, and supervision of suicidal prisoners.184  The 
court considered judicial precedent in previous prison cases, considered 
expert testimony, and applied “the basic principles of minimally 
adequate care to the specific problem of mental health care” in order to 
ascertain the six requirements for minimally adequate care.185 
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit examined the lack of many of 
these same requirements in Estate of Novack ex rel. Turbin v. County of 
Wood and found a showing of deliberate indifference insufficient.186  In 
that case, Shannon Novack, a schizophrenic jail inmate, committed 
suicide; although another inmate reported that Novack was behaving 
strangely and was in need of mental health treatment, the guards did 
nothing to assist Novack.187  The dissent identified procedures that were 
                                                 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 1339. 
185 Id. 
186 See Estate of Novack ex rel. Turbin v. County of Wood, 226 F.3d 525, 525 (7th Cir. 
2001). 
187 Id. at 528.  “Shannon Novack was diagnosed . . . as a paranoid schizophrenic who 
tended to be impulsive and who was a possible suicide risk.”  Id. at 527.  Shortly thereafter, 
he was arrested for outstanding warrants.  Id. at 528.  During Novack’s incarceration, a 
fellow inmate “heard Novack pounding on the cell walls on a daily basis and periodically 
giggling uncontrollably.”  Id.  The inmate reported Novack’s behavior to jail officers and 
stated that Novack might be in need of mental health treatment.  Id.  However, the jail staff 
did nothing in response. Id.  Later, Novack hung himself using a bed sheet.  Id.  “Susan 
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lacking at the Wisconsin county jail.188  First, health care professionals 
did not conduct health evaluations even when warranted by the initial 
screening.189  Second, supervisors were not required to consult with 
health professionals before removing an inmate from suicide watch.190  
Third, once an inmate was placed on suicide watch, no mental health 
professional examined the inmate.191  Finally, like health care 
evaluations, the health care professional did not conduct suicide risk 
evaluations even when warranted by the initial screening.192   
Despite the State’s failure to institute these procedures, the court did 
not find that the State violated the inmates’ constitutional rights.193  The 
majority held that, while these measures are desirable, they are not 
mandatory to establish constitutionally acceptable mental health care 
policies.194  The court stated:  “While we agree with the dissent that there 
are additional policies that could improve [Wood County Jail’s] 
treatment of its mentally ill inmates, the plaintiffs’ proffered evidence 
does not demonstrate that WCJ’s existing policies fall below the 
constitutional standards mandated by the Eighth Amendment.”195 
From these two cases, it can be seen that courts do not agree on even 
the most basic minimum standards for adequate mental health care, such 
as evaluations by mental health professionals.196  As a result, it may be 
more difficult for mentally ill inmates to prove deliberate indifference on 
an institutional level, on top of the already existing burden of proving 
deliberate indifference on an individual level.197  
                                                                                                             
Turbin, Novack’s mother, brought suit on behalf of Novack’s estate and on her own behalf 
against Wood County alleging that the County had deprived her son of his Eighth 
Amendment rights by having inadequate policies and practices for treating mentally ill 
inmates and by failing to adequately train [jail] personnel to provide necessary mental 
health care to her son that would have prevented his suicide.”  Id. at 528-29.  The district 
court granted summary judgment in favor of the county, and Novack’s mother appealed.  
Id. at 529. 
188 Id. at 535. 
189 Id. 
190 Id.  For a complete analysis specifically addressing policies and procedures regarding 
inmates’ suicide risk in jails, see Johnson, supra note 119, at 1236-39. 
191 Novack, 226 F.3d at 535. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. at 532 n.3. 
194 Id. 
195 Id.  For a discussion of the importance of consistent guidelines for establishing a 
constitutionally acceptable mental health treatment program, see infra Part III. 
196 See supra notes 172-83 and accompanying text. 
197 See infra Part III. 
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III.  ANALYSIS:  THE PROBLEMS MENTALLY ILL INMATES FACE IN PROVING  
SERIOUS MEDICAL NEED AND SUBJECTIVE DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE 
While courts have established that mentally ill inmates have the 
constitutional right to adequate mental health treatment, these inmates 
face a tougher burden than their physically ill counterparts in proving 
that the right to treatment has been violated.198  In order to successfully 
bring a § 1983 claim that his right against cruel and unusual punishment 
has been violated, the mentally ill inmate may face much difficulty in 
satisfying the two-part test of Estelle:  that a serious medical need exists 
and that the prison officials were deliberately indifferent to that need.199 
A. Problem 1:  Proving a Serious Medical Need Exists 
The mentally ill prisoner must first show that a serious medical need 
exists.200  This can be shown using either the definition given by the 
Ninth Circuit or the definition used by the First Circuit.201  However, 
problems arise from using either of these definitions, as both are nearly 
impossible for a mentally ill inmate to prove.  Using the Ninth Circuit’s 
definition, the inmate must show that a significant injury or unnecessary 
pain would result by failing to treat the condition.202  This definition may 
be problematic to the mentally ill inmate as compared to a physically ill 
inmate because the terms “injury” and “pain” are ambiguous when 
applied to mental states; however, it is apparent what constitutes an 
injury in the physical sense.203  For example, a reasonable person would 
most likely categorize a broken bone or infection as an injury.204  
However, what constitutes an injury in the mental sense is unclear.  As a 
result, a court may conclude that further psychosis, as a result of not 
treating a psychotic condition, is not an “injury” but only a mental state.   
                                                 
198 See generally infra Parts III.A and III.B. 
199 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).  This case established a two-part test to 
establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment regarding the adequacy of medical care: (1) 
the medical needs of the inmate must be sufficiently serious, and (2) the treatment or lack 
of treatment must demonstrate deliberate indifference to the needs of the inmate.  Id.; see 
also supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text. 
200 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. 
201 For a discussion of the different definitions used by the Circuits, see supra notes 122-43 
and accompanying text. 
202 McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992) (“A ‘serious’ medical need 
exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or 
the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’”). 
203 See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text. 
204 See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text. 
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Similarly, it is just as unclear what constitutes mental pain according 
to a court.  A reasonable person may or may not conclude that a mental 
condition, such as psychosis, is painful.205  Thus, using the Ninth 
Circuit’s definition of serious medical need, an inmate with a mental 
condition may face a tougher burden than an inmate with a physical 
illness. 
While not as ambiguous in its terminology as the Ninth Circuit, the 
definition used by the First Circuit may prove just as problematic for an 
inmate who is attempting to prove a “serious medical need.”  Under the 
definition applied in Gaudreault, a serious medical need may be shown 
either by evidence of a prior diagnosis and treatment or by showing the 
need is obvious to a reasonable person.206  Evidence of a prior diagnosis 
may be more elusive for the mentally ill inmate than a physically ill 
inmate for several reasons.  First, a mental health professional may be 
reluctant to diagnose a condition that is considered a serious mental 
illness due to lack of available resources for treating the inmate.207  Thus, 
the actual diagnosis that an inmate receives in a correctional institution 
may be just as influenced by the availability of resources as it is 
influenced by what signs and symptoms lead to the supposed objective 
diagnosis.208  Even scientific data may be highly influenced by available 
                                                 
205 See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.  For example, one court held that 
“psychological pain” that results from the conditions of solitary confinement is not “pain” 
that constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.  Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1108 
(9th Cir. 1986).  But see Ruiz v. Johnson,  37 F. Supp. 2d 855, 914 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (noting that 
pain and suffering caused by extreme psychological deprivation can support a claim of 
cruel and unusual punishment). 
206 Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, Mass., 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990).  This 
definition has been criticized by commentators for several reasons.  See Cohen & Dvoskin, 
supra note 124, at 341.  The first reason the definition is flawed is that “physicians diagnose 
minor ailments as calling for minimal care, as in headaches and aspirin, all the time.  Thus, 
a medical diagnosis and prescription for care by itself is hardly determinative of 
seriousness.”  Id.  The second reason is that “even if one doctor diagnoses something as 
serious, that does not prevent a second medical opinion to the contrary and one upon 
which a correctional decisionmaker reasonably might choose to rely.”  Id.  The third reason 
is that “there is no mention of a key ingredient from Estelle v. Gamble, i.e., preventable pain; 
the greater the pain and the longer it is endured, the more likely is a supportable diagnosis 
of ‘serious.’”  Id.  The final reason the definition is flawed is that “the obvious-to-a-layman 
factor is oft repeated but little explained.  A bone protruding through the skin is one kind 
of layman’s call, while a mental illness is very different.  Behavior that one person views as 
‘bad’ another characterizes as ‘mad’ and, without more, who may say who is correct?”  Id. 
207 Cohen, supra note 99, at 21 (“A diagnosis in a custodial setting is likely to say as much 
about the availability of resources . . . as about an objective diagnosis based on signs and 
symptoms.”). 
208 Id.; see also Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 106 (“Diagnoses of malingering or 
manipulation too often reflect issues of available resources.”). 
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resources, because the lack of resources may be reflected in the number 
of inmates who are identified as being seriously mentally ill, more so 
than objective clinical assessments.209 
In addition to the lack of available resources to treat a serious mental 
illness, a mental health professional may also be reluctant to diagnose a 
serious mental illness due to a distrust of the inmate’s motivations and 
truthfulness.210  A diagnosis may provide the possibility of secondary 
gain for the inmate, thus creating a motivation for fabricating a mental 
illness.211  An inmate may seek a diagnosis in order to be hospitalized, 
wherein the inmate may enjoy more freedom than on a regular 
cellblock.212  Similarly, the hospital setting may provide an escape from a 
threatening situation in the general population.213  Likewise, an inmate 
may seek hospitalization in order to avoid a work assignment, or may 
even receive a higher pay while hospitalized than on the job.214  In 
addition, an inmate may seek a serious mental health diagnosis in order 
to help set the foundation for an insanity defense or incompetency 
finding.215  Thus, considering the possible motivations and secondary 
gains, a mental health professional’s perceptions and opinions may be 
                                                 
209 Cohen, supra note 99, at 21.  “Indeed, even the coldness of epidemiological data may 
be significantly influenced by the availability of solutions.  That is, the number of captives 
identified as seriously mentally ill may well be responsive to the space and personnel 
available to deal with them, as opposed to clinically sound assessments.”  Id. 
210 See id. at 19 (“In arriving at a judgment of ‘seriousness’ or disease, the possibility of 
secondary gain in the jail and prison setting appears to color the perceptions and reactions 
of mental health professionals.”).  Thus, the facade of an objective clinical judgment in 
prisons may mask a basic distrust for the inmate.  Id. 
211 Id.; see also Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 106.  The possibility of secondary 
gain may lead to an inmate’s manipulation, but manipulation may also be necessary to get 
needed care.  Cohen, supra note 99, at 19.  Some correctional staff are quick to assume the 
inmate is faking and overlook potential mental illness.  Id.  However, behavior such as self-
mutilation can be both manipulative and a symptom of a major mental disorder 
simultaneously.  Id.  In institutions where the staff either lacks the time or motivation to 
pay attention to inmates, the inmates must resort to manipulation, such as creating a 
disturbance or exaggerating his situation, in order to get the attention needed.  Id.  “The 
less attentive or present the staff, on average, the more manipulative prisoners have to be 
to get attention, and this is as true for prisoners who are suffering from serious medical or 
psychiatric ailments as it is for those who are not ill but merely want attention.”  Id.  As a 
result, many seriously mentally ill inmates are simultaneously manipulative to get the care 
they need.  Id. 
212 See Cohen, supra note 99, at 19. 
213 Id.; see also Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 57 (explaining that many mentally ill 
inmates voluntarily isolate themselves from other inmates in order to avoid trouble or 
danger). 
214 See Cohen, supra note 99, at 19. 
215 Id. 
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influenced against a diagnosis.216  For example, a legislative report on 
California prisons found that doctors at one major prison exhibited 
hostile attitudes towards prisoners, and complaints were made that 
doctors did “not adequately diagnose or treat a patient who was a 
disciplinary problem at the prison.”217  This reluctance to diagnose a 
mental illness creates a particularly high hurdle for a mentally ill inmate 
in proving that a serious medical need exists because “in general the 
courts should defer to the ‘professional judgment’ of ‘qualified mental 
health professionals.’”218 
Evidence of prior treatment may be just as problematic as a 
diagnosis for showing that a serious medical need exists, as many 
correctional institutions do not provide treatment for their mentally ill 
inmates.219  For example, the Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that 
four out of ten mentally ill state inmates reported receiving no treatment 
of any kind since entering prison.220  Thus, lack of treatment may not be 
indicative of a lack of an underlying serious medical need. 
If an inmate cannot rely on evidence of a prior diagnosis or 
treatment, the inmate may attempt to show the second part of the Ninth 
Circuit’s definition of “serious medical need”—that the condition is so 
obvious, a reasonable person could easily recognize the need for medical 
attention.221  For example, a protruding bone from the skin obviously 
presents a serious medical need, even to a layperson.222  However, this 
prong of the definition may be more difficult to prove for the mentally ill 
offender.223  If a mental illness does not manifest itself in the form of 
bizarre behavior, then signs and symptoms of a serious mental illness, 
                                                 
216 Id.; see also Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 4.  “[T]he judgment of some mental 
health professionals working in prisons becomes compromised over time.  They become 
quick to find malingering instead of illness; to see mentally ill prisoners as troublemakers 
instead of persons who may be difficult but are nonetheless deserving of serious medical 
attention.”  Cohen, supra note 99, at 19. 
217 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 111 n.3 (1976) (citing ASSEMBLY SELECT COMMITTEE ON 
PRISON REFORM AND REHABILITATION, AN EXAMINATION OF CALIFORNIA’S PRISON 
HOSPITALS 60-61 (1972)). 
218 Joel A. Dvoskin, et al., supra note 176, at 110. 
219 See supra Part II.A. 
220 See Beck & Maruschak, supra note 74. 
221 See Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, Mass., 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990). 
222 See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text. 
223 See Cohen, supra note 99, at 19. 
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which are obvious to a mental health professional, may not be obvious to 
a layperson.224   
This presents a particular problem for the mentally ill inmate in 
proving that a serious medical need was sufficiently obvious to a prison 
guard, or layperson.225  Because of the difficulty for a layperson to detect 
a mental illness as compared to a physical illness, a number of courts 
may distinguish the two types of illnesses by reasoning that a condition 
of the mind is too difficult for a layperson to detect compared to a 
condition that affects the body.226  In addition, even professionals who 
are qualified in the mental health field may disagree on the clinical 
assessment of a mental illness.227  As a result, a court may determine that 
a prison official is not deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious 
mental health need because that need is not satisfactorily obvious to the 
prison official.228 
Thus, a prison guard, or layperson, may not be capable of detecting 
the need for medical attention when a mental condition presents itself.229  
Therefore, the inmate must rely on trained mental health professionals to 
recognize a serious medical need.230  This leads to an additional hurdle 
that a mentally ill inmate must overcome—access to a mental health 
professional.231  A study of the Pennsylvania correctional system 
                                                 
224 See id.  Security staff, due to inadequate training, “are frequently unable to 
differentiate between inmates whose conduct is the result of mental illness and inmates 
whose conduct is unaffected by disease.”  Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 61 (citing 
Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1320 (E.D. Cal. 1995)).  As a result, behavior that 
seems merely disruptive, but does not rise to the level of bizarre, typically is treated with 
punishment without regard to the cause of the behavior.  Id. at 2-3. 
225 See Johnson, supra note 119, at 1251 (discussing the liability of state jails for deliberate 
indifference to the serious medical needs of jail inmates). 
226 Id.  “Courts may reason that, because mental illness affects the mind rather than the 
body, a layperson may not be able to identify a mental illness.”  Id.  Thus, courts may 
conclude that a correctional facility is not “deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s serious 
mental health need because that mental health need is not sufficiently obvious.”  Id. 
227 Id. 
228 Id. 
229 See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
230 However, relying on mental health professionals is also problematic because mental 
health professionals are reluctant to diagnose a serious mental illness due to distrust of an 
inmate’s sincerity and also lack of available resources.  See Cohen, supra note 99, at 19, 21; 
supra text accompanying notes 201-15. 
231 See Cohen, supra note 99, at 8.  The problem of blocked access presents itself in a 
number of ways, including “needless delay between complaint and response, security 
personnel actually obstructing available options for access, failure to inform captives of 
how to obtain aid, and failure to train staff in the recognition and response to symptoms of 
mental illness.”  Id. 
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illustrates the difficulties that inmates face in obtaining access to 
professional medical help and adequate diagnosis and treatment.232  
“[T]he prisoner’s point of contact with a prison’s health care program is 
the sick-call line.  Access may be barred by a guard, who refuses to give 
the convict a hospital pass out of whimsy or prejudice, or in light of a 
history of undiagnosed complaints.”233  If the inmate makes it past the 
first hurdle of getting a hospital pass from a guard, then the inmate 
“commonly first sees a civilian paraprofessional or a nurse, who may 
treat the case with a placebo without actual examination, history-taking, 
or recorded diagnosis.  Even seeing the doctor at some prisons produces 
no more than aspirin for symptoms, such as dizziness and fainting, 
which have persisted for years.”234 
The problem of access to professional mental health care is 
attributable to several factors.235  First, a mental illness and need for 
medical attention may not be obvious to prison guards, who are the 
gatekeepers between the inmate and the mental health staff.236  Thus, the 
inmate is trapped in a catch-22—the guards do not know a problem 
exists until a diagnosis is made by a mental health professional, but the 
inmate cannot get access to a mental health professional until a guard 
knows there is a problem.237   
Another factor that contributes to an inmate’s access problem is the 
distrust that prison guards have for inmates.238  Prison guards, similar to 
mental health professionals, recognize potential secondary gains which 
                                                 
232 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 111 n.3 (1976) (citing Health Law Project, Univ. of Pa, 
Health Care and Conditions in Pennsylvania’s State Prisons, in Am. Bar Ass’n Comm’n on Corr. 
Facilities and Serv., MEDICAL AND HEALTH CARE IN JAILS, PRISONS, AND OTHER 




235 See Johnson, supra note 119, at 1251; Cohen, supra note 99, at 19, 21; Human Rights 
Watch, supra note 1, § 9; Lovell & Rhodes, supra note 5, at 41; infra text accompanying notes 
231-47. 
236 See Johnson, supra note 119, at 1251.  Guards are not only the gatekeepers to the 
mental health staff, they are also in the best position to recognize when a mental health 
need arises.  See Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 75.  “Correctional staff experience 
prisoners at close quarter twenty-four hours a day.  They come to know patterns of 
prisoner behavior and can detect changes in them sometimes better, if not more rapidly, 
than mental health staff whose interactions with prisoners may be more sporadic.”  Id. 
237 See Johnson, supra note 119, at 1251. 
238 See Cohen, Captives, supra note 99, at 19.  The author explained that “the possibility of 
secondary gain in the jail and prison setting appears to color the perceptions and reactions 
of . . . security staff.”  Id. 
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may motivate an inmate to seek a mental illness diagnosis, such as a 
transfer to a less restrictive hospital setting or avoiding work 
assignments.239  Security concerns may also contribute to this general 
distrust of prison inmates.240  An inmate who is experiencing a psychotic 
episode may unknowingly become violent against prison guards or 
continuously break prison rules simply because he does not comprehend 
the rules or his actions.241  Thus, guards may be unwilling to comply 
with an inmate’s request for a mental health evaluation or may be 
reluctant to believe that the inmate is being truthful about his mental 
health condition.242 
The problem of limited or blocked access to mental health 
professionals may also be attributable to the separation and possible 
animosity between security and mental health staff.243  Prison guards are 
                                                 
239 See id.; see also Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 106 (“Security staff, who lack 
mental health training, are often quick to assume that prisoners are acting volitionally or 
manipulatively when they act out.”). 
240 See Cohen, supra note 99, at 21. 
241 See Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 31-32.  For example, schizophrenia may 
cause a person to perceive prison as a threatening environment.  Id. at 31.  As a result, the 
person may act out with violence directed at the prison staff.  Id.  Similarly, bipolar 
disorder can cause a person to become quickly angered when in a manic phase, resulting in 
dangerous outbursts.  Id. at 31-32.  Furthermore, severe psychosis, such as schizophrenia, 
can cause a person to completely misunderstand prison rules.  Id. at 32.  According to Dr. 
Jeffrey Metzner, a correctional mental health expert and clinical professor of psychiatry at 
the University of Colorado’s Health Sciences Center, “[a] small percentage [of prisoners] 
don’t understand the rules.  They’re the ones who are psychotic.  More common is that 
prison rules don’t mean much to someone hearing voices—that’s the least of their 
problems.”  Id.  Dr. Metzner further explains that while a person with paranoid 
schizophrenia may literally understand a rule, the person may nevertheless perceive a 
request to abide by that rule as being part of a conspiracy against him.  Id.  “It’s less of not 
understanding and more of acting on distortions.”  Id.  A study of inmates in South 
Carolina revealed that inmates with schizophrenia have higher rates of infractions than 
non-mentally ill inmates.  Stone, supra note 54, at 301 (“[I]nmates with schizophrenia were 
more likely than control group inmates to have infractions of any given type; have more 
infractions overall; have more violent infractions; have more days spent in ‘lock-up.’”). 
242 See Cohen, supra note 99, at 19, 21. 
243 See Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 61 (“[T]he question of discipline is at the 
heart of the inherent tension between the security mission of prisons and mental health 
considerations.”).  The authors explain that security staff has a legitimate need to maintain 
order and they believe security is best accomplished through punishment for rule breaking.  
Id.  “Many fear that accommodating mental illness will encourage excuses for misconduct, 
condone malingering, encourage others to engage in similar misconduct, and promote a 
general breakdown in order.”  Id.  In addition to security staff’s animosity towards the 
mental health staff, the mental health staff also has animosity towards the security staff 
because they feel subordinate to security staff and are resentful that security decisions take 
precedent over and undercut their treatment efforts.  Id. at 109.  Furthermore, 
“[c]orrectional officers often believe mental health professionals coddle their patients, are 
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reluctant to make special arrangements for an inmate once the mental 
health staff has determined the inmate is mentally ill because of security 
concerns.244  Thus, prison guards may be resentful of the mental health 
staff for making a diagnosis that causes the guards to make special 
accommodations.245  For example, in a 1997 study of the Washington 
Department of Corrections, the researchers found that “[c]ustodial and 
mental health professionals were caught in interlocking category 
traps.”246  Custodial staff did not feel it was helpful for mental health 
professionals to explain that some inmates who exhibit bizarre behavior 
are not mentally ill.247  “On the other hand, mental health professionals 
who urged special handling of psychologically fragile inmates—
especially when they misbehaved—could be resented or dismissed if 
front-line staff felt the mental health specialists didn’t properly 
appreciate the interests of security and the dangers of accommodating 
manipulative behavior.”248  The researchers concluded that “[r]igid 
definitions of the areas of custodial and mental health expertise left 
workers with scant means of helping each other with problems that 
crossed the boundaries.”249  Thus, prison guards may be reluctant to 
allow an inmate access to mental health professionals because a 
diagnosis may force the guards to make accommodations that threaten 
security.250 
A final factor contributing to an inmate’s deficient access to mental 
health professionals is the lack of a constitutional standard for minimally 
                                                                                                             
duped by manipulative prisoners, and don’t sufficiently appreciate security needs.  Mental 
health professionals may view correctional officers as blind to anything but regimentation, 
control, and punishment.”  Id. at 76. 
244 Id. 
245 Lovell & Rhodes, supra note 5, at 40-41. 
246 Id. 
247 Id. at 40. 
248 Id. at 40-41. 
249 Id. at 41.  Alleviation of the lack of coordination between security and mental health 
staff may help remedy the problems faced by mentally ill inmates.  See Moyd, supra note 59, 
at 212 (“[I]mproved coordination of the existing mental health and corrections staff might 
be the best remedy to some of the problems described.”). 
250 See Lovell & Rhodes, supra note 5, at 41.  Training security staff in mental health issues 
could alleviate the strict separation and animosity between security and mental health staff, 
ultimately benefiting the mentally ill inmates.  See Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 76.  
The authors explain that training security staff in mental health issues can help overcome 
the belief that security and mental health staff “are worlds apart in views, concerns, and 
methods of handling prisoners.”  Id.  The authors conclude that “[b]etter mental health 
training for correctional officers and more collaboration between custodial and mental 
health staff could overcome such stereotypes and redound to the benefit of the mentally ill 
offenders under the control and supervision of both.”  Id. 
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adequate care, including mental health evaluations.251  As discussed 
above, the Seventh Circuit determined that while measures such as 
professional health evaluations or suicide risk evaluations after initial 
screening are desirable, they are not mandatory to establish 
constitutionally acceptable mental health care policies.252  Without these 
standards in place, including regular evaluations, a mentally ill inmate 
may never undergo an evaluation or screening by a mental health 
                                                 
251 See supra Part II.D.  Commentators have argued that without consistent policies to 
ensure access to adequate or appropriate care, the rights set forth in Estelle are basically 
nonexistent: 
What, then, are some of the secondary rights attached to this primary 
right of treatment? Without some anterior duty to diagnose—screen or 
classify are acceptable near-synonyms—then the right to care is a 
virtual nullity.  Obviously, more captives must be assessed in some 
fashion than treated, and this, of course, has implications for how some 
initial treatment decisions are made and then how diagnoses are 
accomplished when a previously “healthy,” or at least undetected as 
mentally ill, captive subsequently exhibits signs of serious illness. 
 The requirement of minimally adequate clinical record—to assure 
continuity of care, review of the quality and efficacy of care, to aid in 
future diagnosis, and to respond to legal claims, is yet another 
secondary right. Implicit in this characterization is that treatment of a 
mental disorder is not likely to be a one-shot intervention; that 
treatment will likely be ongoing, although the place, nature, or 
duration of care will likely vary over time. 
 Access to minimally adequate care is also an important secondary 
right.  Without ready access to diagnosticians and appropriate mental 
health professionals as caregivers, the Estelle-mandated right to 
treatment is merely precatory.  The issue of ready access presents itself 
in judicial proceedings in a variety of ways, such as needless delay 
between complaint and response, security personnel actually 
obstructing available options for access, failure to inform captives of 
how to obtain aid, and failure to train staff in the recognition and 
response to symptoms of mental illness. 
 Those persons with medical and mental health care 
responsibilities fall within the province of professionals—persons who 
by training and experience are qualified to provide diagnosis, 
treatment, and prognosis.  While courts will not likely mandate 
educational or experience requirements for recruiting security staff, 
they certainly will insist on appropriate credentials for the surgeon’s 
knife or the clinician’s pharmacology. 
 Diagnosis, adequate records, ready access to mandated treatment, 
and an appropriate level of education or training for caregivers are the 
crucial secondary rights in this area of law. 
Cohen, supra note 99, at 8. 
252 See Estate of Novack ex rel. Turbin v. County of Wood, 226 F.3d 525, 532 (7th Cir. 
2000). 
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professional unless security staff deems it necessary.253  However, prison 
security personnel do not easily detect mental illness because they are 
not trained to recognize the symptoms of mental illness.254  Thus, the 
need for medical attention may not be obvious to prison guards, who are 
the gatekeepers to mental health professionals.255  As a result, access to a 
trained professional, who may be the only one to find a serious mental 
health need sufficiently obvious, is blocked because consistent 
requirements for regular evaluations have not been established.  
Ultimately, because both the First and Ninth Circuits’ definitions are 
particularly problematic for mentally ill inmates, the inmates face much 
difficulty in proving the “serious medical need” requirement of the 
Estelle test. 
B. Problem 2:  Proving Deliberate Indifference 
If a mentally ill inmate overcomes the obstacle of showing that a 
serious medical need exists, the next hurdle an inmate faces is proving 
that prison personnel were deliberately indifferent to that need.256  The 
test set forth by the Supreme Court is that a prison official “must both be 
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a 
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the 
inference.”257  Thus, in order to establish deliberate indifference, an 
                                                 
253 While such standards that would provide adequate mental health care are currently 
not in place throughout the judicial system, these standards are generally known to the 
mental health community.  See Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 4.  The known 
standards include:  systematic screening and evaluation for mental illness; procedures to 
provide inmates with timely access to mental health personnel and services; treatment that 
includes a range of therapeutic interventions including medication; levels of care including 
acute and long-term care, inpatient and outpatient care; enough qualified professionals to 
develop individualized treatment plans and enough personnel to implement such plans; 
adequate and confidential clinical record keeping; suicide prevention procedures for 
identifying and treating suicidal prisoners; and discharge planning.  Id.  “Peer review and 
quality assurance programs help ensure that proper policies on paper are translated into 
practice inside the prisons.”  Id. 
254 See Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 76. 
255 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 110 n.3 (1976).  “When ill, the prisoner’s point of 
contact with a prison’s health care program is the sick-call line.  Access may be barred by a 
guard, who refuses to give the convict a hospital pass out . . . .”  Id. (citing Health Law 
Project, Univ. of Pa., Health Care and Conditions in Pennsylvania’s State Prisons, in Am. Bar 
Ass’n  Comm’n  on Corr. Facilities and Servs., MEDICAL AND HEALTH CARE IN JAILS, PRISONS, 
AND OTHER CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES:  A COMPILATION OF STANDARDS AND MATERIALS 71, 
81-82 (1974)). 
256 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. 
257 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 
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inmate must prove that prison officials subjectively knew of the inmate’s 
serious mental health need and chose to ignore it.258   
Proving subjective knowledge on the part of prison officials may be 
next to impossible.259  Unless a mental illness manifests itself in the form 
of abnormal or bizarre behavior, the serious medical need is concealed in 
the mind of the mentally ill inmate.260  Consequently, the need for 
medical attention may not be obvious to a prison guard who has no 
professional mental health training.261  “The lack of psychological 
expertise among prison guards makes a specific showing of awareness 
next to impossible.  By virtue of the prison guards’ deficiency, courts 
continually hold guards to a lesser standard in recognizing these 
conditions.”262  Thus, while mentally ill inmates are blocked from mental 
health professionals by guards acting as gatekeepers, the guards who 
prevent the inmates from getting professional assistance are shielded 
from the liability attached to subjective knowledge.263  Therefore, the 
mentally ill inmate who is denied access to a mental health professional 
has no recourse against individual prison security guards, even if the 
guards should have known of the serious medical need, because the 
guards can claim they did not have the requisite subjective knowledge of 
the need.264 
While the subjective knowledge requirement creates a hurdle in 
making a claim against prison personnel on an individual level, the 
requirement also prevents a mentally ill inmate from pursuing a remedy 
against the correctional facility on an institutional level.265  One 
commentator, discussing solitary confinement, describes how a violation 
of an inmate’s rights can occur on an institutional, rather than just on an 
individual level.266  “[T]he parties responsible for the severe deprivation 
are the persons behind the design, construction and implementation . . . .  
Conditions-in-confinement cases do not involve one prison official 
                                                 
258 See id. 
259 See  Boyer, supra note 174, at 332-33. 
260 See id.  For a description of the form that bizarre or self-destructive behavior may take, 
see Lovell & Rhodes, supra note 5, at 41.  However, “[p]sychological pain does not always 
display physical characteristics.”  Christine M. Rebman, The Eighth Amendment and Solitary 
Confinement: The Gap in Protection from Psychological Consequences, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 567, 
618 (1999). 
261 See Boyer, supra note 174, at 333. 
262 Id. 
263 See id.; see also supra note 229. 
264 See Boyer, supra note 174, at 332-33. 
265 See id. at 332. 
266 See id. 
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intentionally, knowingly and maliciously harming an inmate.  Rather, 
the evil is rooted in the design of complete solitary confinement.”267  
However, as previously discussed, lower courts have not established 
consistent legal requirements for designing an adequate mental health 
care program.268  Thus, without requirements for prison mental health 
treatment policies, proving that prison officials subjectively knew that 
certain policies or procedures did not meet the needs of mentally ill 
inmates would be difficult.269  For example, if an inmate with a severe 
mental illness is never evaluated by a mental health professional, the 
facility can avoid liability by claiming that it was unaware that not 
having a policy for regular screening was inadequate because no 
consistent guideline for regular screening existed.  Another way prison 
facilities can circumvent deliberate indifference is to claim that 
inadequate mental health care is due to lack of resources rather than 
intentional denial of care.270  As a result, claims against prison facilities 
could be easily defeated. 
Two Supreme Court Justices recognized the problem that the 
subjective requirement creates.271  In the dissent of Estelle, Justice Stevens 
argued that the Court attached too much importance to the motivations 
of prison personnel in determining whether an inmate had suffered cruel 
and unusual punishment.272  Justice Stevens argued that the subjective 
state of mind of prison personnel should not be the focal point, but 
rather should be the nature of the punishment.273   
Likewise, Justice White expressed a similar concern in his 
concurrence in Wilson.274  He noted that inhumane conditions in a prison 
do not always result from single incidents, but may result from the 
actions of many prison officials, both inside and outside the prison, over 
an extensive period of time.275  Both Justices recognized that the problem 
with one prison condition, solitary confinement, is traceable to the 
                                                 
267 Id. (emphasis added). 
268 See Johnson, supra note 119, at 1237 n.54; see also, supra Part II.D. 
269 See Boyer, supra note 174, at 332-33. 
270 Genty, supra note 29, at 393 (“[P]rison officials will be able to defeat a § 1983 action 
challenging inhumane prison conditions simply by showing that the conditions are caused 
by insufficient funding from the state legislature rather than by any deliberate indifference 
on the part of the prison officials.”) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 310-11 (1991)). 
271 See Boyer, supra note 174, at 332-33. 
272 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 116 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Boyer, supra note 174, at 332-33. 
273 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 116; Boyer, supra note 174, at 332-33. 
274 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 310 (1991) (White, J., concurring); Boyer, supra note 174, 
at 332-33. 
275 Wilson, 501 U.S. at 310; Boyer, supra note 174, at 332-33. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 2 [2004], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol39/iss2/7
2004] Proving Deliberate Indifference 531 
 
design of solitary confinement, not the immediate actions of prison 
personnel.276  They noted that applying the subjective prong to cases 
involving prison conditions, such as solitary confinement, is inherently 
problematic because the immediate actions are not the source of the 
problem.277  Additionally, they noted that requiring subjective intent was 
both a departure from precedent and impossible to prove on a large 
number of cases.278   
Moreover, not only claims of inadequate mental health care, but also 
almost any claim of cruel and unusual punishment can be circumvented 
so long as prison officials can show some good faith basis for their 
actions or omissions.279  Theoretically, even the use of whips and chains 
could be justified by claiming that such disciplinary means are necessary 
to improve security or are needed in facilities that do not have enough 
resources to employ more guards.280  Thus, proving subjective 
knowledge on the part of prison officials, both on an individual level and 
on an institutional level, may be next to impossible. 
Ultimately, proving a “serious medical need” and subjective 
deliberate indifference poses exceptionally high hurdles for mentally ill 
inmates to overcome when attempting to obtain a remedy for a violation 
of their Eighth Amendment right to adequate mental health care.  
Although these hurdles are significant, establishing consistent guidelines 
for adequate mental health care and changing the subjective deliberate 
indifference requirement to an objective standard can lessen these 
hurdles. 
IV.  PROPOSAL:  ESTABLISHING CONSISTENT GUIDELINES FOR ADEQUATE 
MENTAL HEALTH CARE AND CHANGING THE SUBJECTIVE DELIBERATE 
INDIFFERENCE REQUIREMENT TO AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD 
This Note suggests a two-fold proposal in order to alleviate the 
particular barriers that mentally ill inmates face when attempting to 
obtain a remedy for a violation of their right to adequate mental health 
                                                 
276 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 116 (1976); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 310; Boyer, supra note 174, 
at 332-33. 
277 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 116; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 310; Boyer, supra note 174, at 332-33. 
278 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 116; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 310; Boyer, supra note 174, at 332-33. 
279 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 116; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 310; Boyer, supra note 174, at 332-33. 
280 See Genty, supra note 29, at 393.  Even the use of dungeons and shackles may satisfy an 
intent-based test if prisons offer a good-faith justification.  Id.  “A standard focusing 
primarily on the motivations of the prison administration may, therefore, fail to remedy 
even those conditions widely viewed as intolerable.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
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care.  First, consistent guidelines for adequate mental health care, 
including systematic screening for mental illness, should be established.  
Second, the subjective standard should be removed from § 1983 claims 
for Eighth Amendment violations and an objective standard adopted.  
Taken together, these changes would reduce the difficulty that mentally 
ill inmates have in remedying violations of their constitutional rights. 
A. Establishing Consistent Guidelines for Adequate Mental Health Care 
First, consistent guidelines need to be established among the circuits 
as to the requirements for adequate medical care.281  More specifically, 
these guidelines need to include procedures for providing evaluations 
and diagnoses of the mentally ill, training prison guards in mental illness 
and suicide risk symptoms, and requiring referrals to trained mental 
health professionals if such symptoms present themselves.282  The 
following guidelines for a constitutionally acceptable mental health 
treatment program established in Ruiz v. Estelle provide a framework for 
establishing model guidelines for an adequate mental health program:283   
(1) The prison must have a systematic program of 
screenings and evaluations of prisoners in order to 
identify those who need mental health treatment;  
(2) Treatment for a prisoner must entail more than just 
segregation and close supervision;  
(3) The prison must employ enough trained mental 
health professionals to be able to identify and treat the 
mentally ill in an individualized manner;  
                                                 
281 For a discussion on the disparity between the circuits on what constitutes adequate 
mental health care, see supra Part II.D. 
282 Mandatory referrals are essential because guards often see the need for a referral but 
choose not to make the referral.  See Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 76.  Also, 
training guards when and how to make referrals is important.  Id.  “[A]ll of the correctional 
officers we interviewed felt that they did not have enough training in recognizing mental 
illness in inmates and in making decisions about referring inmates for mental health 
services.”  Id. (quoting Kenneth Appelbaum, et. al, Report on the Psychiatric Management of 
John Salvi in Massachusetts Department of Correction Facilities 1995-1996 35, 39, submitted to 
the Massachusetts Department of Correction, January 31, 1997, on file at Human Rights 
Watch). 
283 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1339 (S.D. Tex. 1980), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th 
Cir. 1982). 
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(4) The treating professionals must keep accurate, 
complete, and confidential records of the mental health 
treatment process;  
(5) A prisoner cannot be treated with a prescription for 
behavior-altering medications in dangerous amounts, by 
dangerous methods, or without acceptable supervision 
and periodic evaluations; and  
(6) The prison must have a program for the 
identification, treatment, and supervision of suicidal 
prisoners.284   
In addition to the six requirements provided by Ruiz, a seventh 
requirement should be added to complete the model guidelines: 
(7) Security staff must receive adequate training to recognize 
the basic signs and symptoms of mental illness and the 
security staff must be required to make referrals to the mental 
health staff if such signs or symptoms are detected.285 
The seventh guideline, requiring adequate training of guards in 
recognizing the basic signs of mental illness and requiring referrals if 
such signs are detected, would serve to assist mentally ill inmates in 
receiving needed treatment if the time between mandatory evaluations is 
lengthy.286  Training guards should enable them to recognize symptoms 
                                                 
284 Id.  For a discussion of the inconsistency on constitutionally acceptable mental health 
treatment standards, see supra Part III.D.  These requirements are viewed from a judicial 
perspective, but from a clinical perspective, an adequate mental health care program 
should include: 
• Crisis intervention for short-term treatment, usually in an 
infirmary for less than ten days; 
• Acute care, usually in an inpatient, hospital-type facility; 
• Chronic care, including special needs housing for those unable to 
function in the general population but not needing 
hospitalization; 
• Outpatient services; 
• Consultation; and 
• Discharge/transfer planning. 
Clarence J. Sundram, Monitoring the Quality and Utilization of Mental Health Services in 
Correctional Facilities, 7 D.C. L. REV. 163, 165 (2003) (quoting Jeffrey L. Metzner, An 
Introduction to Correctional Psychiatry, Part III, 26 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 107-15 
(1998)). 
285 The italicized language is the contribution of the Author. 
286 See Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 75.  Training guards in mental health issues 
is especially important.  Id.  Training would not only aid correctional staff to better respond 
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of mental illness and signs of a suicide risk, but the training need not 
enable them to be able to treat or diagnose mental illness or recognize 
when an inmate is “faking.”  Proper diagnoses and treatment would be 
accomplished by the required mandatory referrals by guards to the 
mental health staff when such symptoms arise.  Once these guidelines 
are adopted, a quality assurance program would ensure that these 
general guidelines, allowing for individual tailoring by each correctional 
facility, are effectuated.287  
These guidelines, providing for systematic screening for mental 
illness and a program for the identification and supervision of suicidal 
inmates, would solve the problem of the gap between mental health 
professionals and inmates and facilitate inmates’ timely access to 
professional and adequate care.288  Without systematic screenings or 
                                                                                                             
to problems caused by inmates with mental illness, it would also help them to better assist 
the mental health staff.  Id. at 76.  Warden Gloria Henry, of California’s Valley State Prison 
for Women, told Human Rights Watch that “[t]hey need more training to give a better idea 
of how to identify and deal with individuals with mental health issues.”  Id. (quoting 
Human Rights Watch interview with Gloria Henry, warden, Valley State Prison for 
Women, California, July 17, 2002).  “When you’re trained in security, to have people 
comply with rules and regulations, that’s what your expectations are.  When you’re dealing 
with people with mental health problems, you need to know how to approach them.”  Id.  
It has been argued by Professor Hans Toch that the mental health training that guards 
receive should go beyond “a diluted psychology-101-type lecture format.”  Id. at 78 
(quoting Human Rights Watch interview with Hans Toch, February 18, 2003).  Instead, he 
argues that “officers should receive hands-on training that presents officers with real 
symptoms being experienced by real prisoners in the prisons in which the officers work 
and that integrates those officers into the mental health teams and case conferences in 
which prisoners’ mental health needs are discussed.”  Id.  Currently, mental health training 
for security staff is lacking in many states, and in 2001, ten states reported not providing 
any training at all.  Id. at 76.  A 2001 report by the National Institute of Corrections revealed 
that “[t]en prison systems claimed to include roughly four hours of mental health classes in 
their basic training package for new correctional officers, thirteen admitted to providing 
fewer than four hours, and only seven stated that they provided more than four hours of 
training.”  Id. (citing National Institute of Corrections, Provision of Mental Health Care in 
Prisons 9 (2001)). 
287 Clarence J. Sundram, Monitoring the Quality and Utilization of Mental Health Services in 
Correctional Facilities, 7 D.C. L. REV. 163, 169 (2003).  Many standard-setting organizations, 
such as the American Psychological Association (“APA”), recommend quality assurance 
programs.  Id.  For example, the APA recommends that each facility should have a quality 
assurance program that describes the goals of the mental health program, the means to 
achieve those goals, and the means of evaluating these objectives.  Id. (citing APA 
GUIDELINES § B.2.a); see also Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1209 (N.D. Cal. 1995) 
(explaining that a quality assurance program “is ‘standard practice in virtually every health 
care facility in the country’ and is considered a ‘fundamental part’ of the provision of  
health care”). 
288 See supra Part III.A for a discussion of inmates’ problem of access to professional 
mental health care.  “[O]ne of the most frequent complaints voiced by mentally ill prisoners 
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required referrals, an inmate’s contact with a mental health professional 
depends on the judgment of the guards, who oversee the daily activities 
of inmates.289  Mandatory evaluations and screening for mental illness 
would bridge the gap and alleviate the inmate’s catch-22 dilemma, 
which is created because the guards do not know a problem exists until a 
diagnosis is made by a mental health professional, but the inmate cannot 
get access to a mental health professional until a guard knows there is a 
problem.290  Thus, with mandatory screening of all inmates for mental 
illness, access to trained mental health professionals would not depend 
on the judgment of prison guards who may not recognize a serious 
medical need.291  This would also avoid the problem of blocked access to 
mental health staff due to prison guards’ distrust of inmates, security 
concerns, and animosity between security and mental health staff.292  As 
a result, the problem that mentally ill inmates have in proving the 
“serious medical need” prong would be lessened because they would 
have easier access to the mental health staff who could provide evidence 
of a diagnosis or recognize a serious medical need. 
In addition to solving the problem, the guidelines would be 
appropriate to adopt because they are attainable for facilities with 
limited resources.293  The general guidelines also allow for discretion by 
prison officials in creating mental health programs.294  For example, in an 
impoverished state, a prison could choose to contract with a local health 
care facility to provide psychiatric care, instead of employing a full-time 
psychiatrist and staff, if only part-time services are needed for a small 
mentally ill population.  On the other hand, a facility with more 
                                                                                                             
is that they have to wait days, weeks, and even months to see mental health staff after they 
request a meeting . . . .”  Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 103-04.  A systematic 
screening should be done early upon the inmate’s entry into the correctional system to 
ensure that adequate care is received on a timely basis.  See id. at 101.  Thus, effective 
screening should take place within a reasonable time, such as seven days.  Id.  If the 
screening reveals that the inmate has been receiving mental illness medication or has 
previously been hospitalized for a mental condition, the inmate should receive a more 
comprehensive evaluation.  Id. 
289 See supra Part III.A. 
290 See supra Part III.A; see also Johnson, supra note 119, at 1251. 
291 See supra Part III.A. 
292 See supra Part III.A. 
293 See Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1339 (S.D. Tex. 1980), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 
679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982). 
294 Courts defer to the discretion of prison personnel.  See Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. 
Supp. 1282, 1301 (E.D. Cal. 1995).  “[I]n cases challenging conditions of prison confinement, 
courts must strike a careful balance between identification of constitutional deficiencies 
and deference to the exercise of the wide discretion enjoyed by prison administrators in the 
discharge of their duties.”  Id. 
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resources could choose to establish an entire separate facility dedicated 
to the treatment of its mentally ill population.  Thus, each correctional 
facility could establish an individually tailored program based on the 
facility’s unique inmate population, the inmates’ needs, and available 
resources, so long as the basic guidelines are followed. 
B. Changing the Subjective Deliberate Indifference Standard to an Objective 
Standard 
The second part of the proposal is to remove the subjective standard 
from § 1983 claims for violations of the Eighth Amendment and adopt an 
objective standard.  That way, prison guards could be held liable if they 
should have known of the medical need, rather than avoiding liability by 
claiming they simply did not actually know of the need.295  As a result, 
the ultimate determination of whether an inmate has been denied 
adequate mental health care would depend on the impact of prison 
conditions on the inmate, including existing mental health care policies, 
rather than the intent of prison officials.296  Although an objective 
standard could potentially hold some prison personnel liable for 
deprivations of mental health care of which they had no actual 
knowledge, the standard would remove the liability shield for those who 
simply fail to attempt to recognize a problem.  In addition, although the 
new standard for prison staff is higher under an objective test, that 
standard is only one of negligence.  It is not unreasonable to hold prison 
staff liable for negligence when they are responsible for people’s lives. 
                                                 
295 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); see also supra note 169 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of the requirement of proof that an official has 
knowledge of a particular need. 
296 See generally Genty, supra note 29, at 380.  The author explains how shifting the focus 
to an impact-based analysis reduces bias against inmates and makes the decision fairer.  Id. 
at 393-94.  “Focusing on the impact upon the prisoner of prison conditions and guard 
conduct forces a judge or juror to attempt to empathize with the prisoner, i.e., to see the 
prison through the prisoner’s eyes.”  Id. at 394-95.  With the focus on impact, both judges 
and jurors would question:  “‘How would it be for me to live in conditions like that?  Those 
conditions are appalling.’  If the judge and juror can feel the prison as lived by the prisoner, 
there is some chance that intolerable conditions or conduct will be found to be cruel and 
unusual.”  Id. at 395.  On the other hand, focusing on intent “reinforces what both judges 
and jurors are naturally inclined to do anyway:  identify with the prison employees (who 
are like them) and see the prison through their eyes.”  Id. at 395.  “Judge and juror are likely 
to think:  ‘That could be me in that job.  It’s hard, and the administration and guards are 
doing the best they can.’”  Id.  When a prison is viewed through the eyes of prison 
employees, “as a scary, chaotic place inhabited by sinister and violent ‘others,’ 
underfunded and understaffed-even the worst conditions and conduct are unlikely to be 
found cruel and unusual.”  Id. 
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Replacing the subjective standard with an objective standard would 
provide a safeguard if the procedural guidelines in the first part of the 
proposal, such as systemic screening and mandatory referrals, are not 
followed.  For example, if a guard should have been aware that an 
inmate is mentally ill based on training for recognizing symptoms, he 
should make a referral to the mental health staff.  However, if the guard 
fails to make the referral because he believes the inmate is untruthful, the 
inmate still has a remedy.  The guard would be liable under an objective 
standard because the guard reasonably should have known that a 
serious medical need existed based on his past training, or at least should 
have made a referral to trained staff to make such a determination.  More 
specifically, the guard would not be liable under the objective standard if 
he could not differentiate between an actual symptom and “faking,” but 
the guard would be liable for failure to make a mandatory referral. 
Finally, removing the subjective requirement would also remove the 
hurdle that inmates face when trying to obtain a remedy for an 
institutional, rather than individual, violation.297  An example of the 
problem with the subjective requirement follows:  if a prison fails to 
employ enough mental health staff to adequately meet the needs of the 
mentally ill inmates, the inmates may be unable to prove that the prison 
officials, who decide how many people to employ even though they may 
never actually be present at the prison, consciously knew that the needs 
of the inmates were going unmet.298  However, with an objective 
requirement, the inmates may be able to prove that prison officials 
should have known of the serious medical need, had hiring policies been 
evaluated. 
If both parts of this proposal are implemented, a mentally ill inmate 
like Pamela Young, referred to in the introduction of this Note, would 
either never have experienced such horrific treatment, or could have 
proved more easily that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to 
her serious mental health needs.299  With the guidelines in place, Pamela 
would have been screened for mental illness and evaluated by a 
professional.  Her treatment would have included more than just being 
locked in solitary confinement.  If she complained that she heard voices, 
guards would have been required to make an immediate referral to 
mental health professionals.  In addition, guards would have been 
                                                 
297 For a discussion of the problem that inmates face in succeeding on a claim on an 
institutional level, see supra notes 259-64 and accompanying text. 
298 See supra notes 259-64 and accompanying text. 
299 See supra notes 7-21 and accompanying text. 
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trained to recognize that her bizarre behavior—attempting to flood her 
cell with urine and repeatedly banging the door—was potentially a 
symptom of mental illness, also requiring a referral.   
However, if the only treatment Pamela received was solitary 
confinement and being chained to a bed, she could bring a claim against 
the prison.  First, a court would look at whether the prison instituted a 
mental health program that followed the seven requirements of the 
model guidelines.300  If not, the court would find that the prison was 
deliberately indifferent to Pamela’s mental health needs and hold the 
prison liable for violating her constitutional rights.  If the court found 
that the prison did have a mental health program that followed the 
requirements, the court would then use an objective standard to evaluate 
the actions of the guards.301  As such, the court would determine whether 
the guards should have known that her bizarre behavior and hearing 
voices were symptoms of a mental illness that required a mandatory 
referral to the mental health staff.  Therefore, it would not be impossible 
for Pamela to prove that the prison was deliberately indifferent and 
violated her constitutional right to adequate mental health care. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Mental illness plagues the correctional system at a rate of nearly one 
out of every six inmates.  These inmates have the right to adequate 
mental health care, as provided by the Eighth Amendment.  However, 
when this right is violated, mentally ill inmates face the high hurdle of 
proving subjective deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs 
in order to obtain a remedy for the constitutional violation.  Providing 
consistent guidelines for adequate mental health care that include 
mandatory screening and evaluations for mental illness, training prison 
guards in mental illness and suicide risk symptoms, and requiring 
referrals to trained mental health professionals if such symptoms present 
themselves, would bridge the gap between security and mental health 
staff.  Following these procedures would also alleviate the barrier to 
mental health professionals that is created by guards’ ignorance of 
mental illness symptoms, distrust of inmates, security concerns, and 
animosity between security and mental health staff. 
In addition to creating consistent policies and procedures, removing 
the subjective knowledge component would make remedying a 
                                                 
300 For a discussion of the model guidelines, see supra text accompanying notes 275-79. 
301 See supra text accompanying note 289. 
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constitutional violation easier for a mentally ill inmate.  Not only could 
security staff be held liable for violations where the guards should have 
known of a serious medical need, but also the correctional facility could 
be held liable for acts or omissions which result in inhumane conditions 
over a period of time.  Taken together, removing the subjective 
knowledge component and establishing consistent guidelines for 
adequate mental health care would lessen the difficulty mentally ill 
inmates have in remedying violations of their constitutional rights. 
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